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BARGAINING FOR INTEGRATION
SHIRLEY LIN*
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires employers to restructure
exclusionary environments upon the request of their employees with disabilitiesso
that they may continue working. Under a virtually unexamined aspect of the mandate, however, the parties must negotiate in good faith over every accommodation
request. This "interactive process," while decentralized and potentially universal,
occurs on a private, individualized basis.
Although the very existence of the mandate has been heavily debated, scholarship
has yet to acknowledge that the ADA is actually ambivalentto individuals' relative
power to effect organizationalchange through bargaining. This Article is the first to
critique the law's interactive requirements. The process does not appear in the
statute, but is an agency's conceptualization of the mandate as an idealized
exchange. By evaluating new empirical evidence relating to race, class, and gender
outcomes against the meso-level theories underlying the mandate, this Article
argues that the process disempowers employees through deficits of information,
individuated design, and employers' resistance to costs. Nonetheless, momentum to
replicate the mandate to accommodate pregnancy and other workers' needs continues apace.
As the workplace is increasingly deemed essential to societal well-being, this new
frame reveals the law's design flaws and unfulfilled potential. In response, this
Article proposes reallocationsof power so that the state may gather and publicize
organizational precedent to facilitate structuralanalysis, regulation, and innovation
at scale; legally recognize that antidiscrimination work, particularly dismantling
ableist environments, is a collective endeavor; and expand the social insurance
model for accommodations. Perhaps, then, the ADA's original vision of institutional transformation may become possible.
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INTRODUCTION

For three decades, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
has offered a bold new approach to civil rights by acknowledging that
workplaces are embedded with legacy practices of exclusion. 1 The law
recognizes that health, social, and institutional factors can render
employees disabled and imposes a duty on employers to provide an
accommodation for those disabilities upon request.2 This duty, known
1 Michael Ashley Stein, Anita Silvers, Bradley A. Areheart & Leslie Pickering Francis,
Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 696 (2014) (noting the
accommodations requirement "challenges the assumption that labor markets begin from
neutral and fair baselines"); see also infra Section I.B.1.
2 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. How "disability" is
defined is the subject of dynamic discourse. Purposive definitions for laws such as the ADA
and federal program eligibility vary, but disability is increasingly viewed through the social
model, which conceives of disability as a social consequence of the interaction between
individuals' impairments and environmental conditions, both physical and societal.
Richard V. Burkhauser, Andrew J. Houtenville & Jennifer R. Tennant, Capturing the
Elusive Working-Age Population with Disabilities: Reconciling Conflicting Social Success
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as the accommodations mandate, acquired its current form during an
era of pronounced deregulation when the Reagan Administration's

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) devised the
interactive process to carry out this mandate.3 In 1991, the EEOC
announced that an interactive process should begin the moment an
employee seeks an accommodation from an employer, setting into
motion a thicket of procedural and substantive determinations the
parties must resolve. 4 While the mandate's very existence drew the
most controversy after the ADA's passage, now that it has withstood
judicial and ideological challenge it has attracted considerable attention as a template for reform. 5 However, the persistence of structural
inequities within workplaces reveals the mandate's potential flaw: it
expects individual employees to achieve social change through what is
effectively private, common-law bargaining.
Although it is a defining feature of modern disability law, the
accommodations mandate has not yet made accommodations acces-

sible for many Americans who require them.6 After passing the ADA,
Estimates from the Current Population Survey and American Community Survey, 24 J.
DISABILrTY POL. STUD. 195, 196 (2014); Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just

Right": The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma,
83 IND. L.J. 181, 188-89 (2008). By contrast, under the medical model, a disability is
defined as a condition that solely requires medical treatment or therapy. Id. at 185-86;
Elizabeth F. Emens, Essay, DisabilityAdmin: The Invisible Costs of Being Disabled, 105
MINN. L. REV. 2329, 2337-40 (2021) (explaining how the models historically informed the

ADA). This Article alternates between use of people-first and disability-first language in
acknowledgement of the diversity of views among disability advocates.
3 See infra Section I.A; Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 826-30,
828-30 n.9 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination"] (summarizing the
literature and challenging the argument that "traditional" antidiscrimination law and the
ADA accommodations mandate are substantively different); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PrTY:
PEOPLE WITH DISABILTES FORGING A NEw CIVIL RIGHTS MOvEMENT 120-22 (1993)
("The Reagan-Bush administration had been sworn into office in 1981 with a mandate for
deregulation."). The scope of this Article addresses the ADA's employment title, Title I,
with reference to other provisions where relevant. Titles II and III of the ADA-

addressing public employers and public accommodations or commercial facilities,
respectively-require entities to undertake structural changes under proscriptions against

physically inaccessible buildings. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12132, 12182.
4 See discussion infra Section I.A.2, notes 160-82 and accompanying text (analyzing an
illustrative failure-to-accommodate claim); infra note 71 (demonstrating how several
circuit courts reasoned that determining whether an interactive process is mandatory

depends upon whether a substantive right to accommodation actually existed).
5 See PETER BLANCK, MICHAEL WATERSTONE, WILLIAM N. MYHILL & CHARLES D.
SIEGAL, DISABmLTY CIVIL RIGHTS LAw AND POLICY 61-63 (3d ed. 2014) (providing a
history of Congressional debate over the reasonable accommodations mandate and its
potential costs); infra Section II.B (summarizing reform proposals).

6 This includes Americans who are employed and those who could be employed if
accommodated. See infra Section II.A.1 (showing that high rates of non-accommodation
persist).
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Congress delegated the task of devising implementing regulations to
the EEOC. 7 The agency then presented the interactive process, an
exchange in which employers and employees would ideally collaborate in identifying an accommodation that would enable the employee
8
to continue performing the essential functions of a particular job. The
mandate nevertheless continued to fuel social and judicial backlash
against the ADA, as well as a rich vein of responsive legal scholarship
9
that brought nuance to the debate over the law's reach. These protracted first-wave struggles over who qualifies as disabled under the
law, however, appear to have led courts and scholars to uncritically
accept the interactive process and presume that it adequately balances
employers' prerogatives against employees' needs. The literature has
yet to acknowledge that the mandate relies upon a bargaining-based
model to secure compliance with a civil right, 10 or that the law's design
fails to generate the lasting norms necessary for workplaces to dismantle discrimination at scale.11
7 42 U.S.C. § 12116.
8 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2020). The employee must be able to perform the essential
function of their job to qualify for the ADA's protection. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining

"qualified individual").
9 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 501, 503-04, 513, 516 (2000) (attributing social and legal backlash
against the Rehabilitation Act and ADA to societal and judicial misunderstanding of the
social model of disability, conflicting social norms relating to distributive and corrective
justice, and perceptions about who should benefit from the ADA); Michelle A. Travis,
Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits
Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 312 (2009) [hereinafter Travis,
Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash] (describing the accommodations mandate as the
"primary target" of socio-legal backlash against the ADA); Bagenstos, "Rational
Discrimination,"supra note 3, at 902 (focusing on the effect of the anti-ADA backlash on
civil rights advocates' emphasis on the distinction between antidiscrimination and
accommodations so as to protect canonical antidiscrimination protections under Title VII);
Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE
L.J. 79, 135-36 (2003) [hereinafter Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability
Accommodations] (observing debate among academic scholars regarding whether the
ADA mandate is a form of antidiscrimination, redistribution, or affirmative action).
10 Cf Doron Dorfman, [Un]Usual Suspects: Deservingness, Scarcity, and Disability
Rights, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 557, 563, 600 (2020) (framing disability law as "largely left
for private enforcement by members of society" in everyday interactions where "formal
law enforcement is absent," at least in the immediate sense (citing SARAH MARUSEK,
POLITICS OF PARKING: RIGHTS, IDENTITY, AND PROPERTY 138-39 (2012))).

11 Jasmine E. Harris argues in Taking Disability Public that disability laws
"overvalu[e]" privacy, incurring social costs including an inaccurate understanding of the

actual prevalence and breadth of disability. 169 U. PA. L. REv. 1681, 1726 (2021)
[hereinafter Harris, Taking Disability Public]. Further, Harris notes a default to status-quo

stigma can cause people with disabilities to "[c]over[],"

id.

at 1732 n.234,

underaccommodate, or privately absorb the costs of accommodation instead of shifting
pressure on the public to "change [ableist] structures, practices, and policies," id. at

1733-36.
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This Article is the first to critically assess the institutional design
of the ADA's interactive requirements. 12 By analyzing empirical evidence, court decisions, and tensions among theories of equality, procedural justice, and common-law negotiation underlying the mandate,
it reconceptualizes the law's design as a product of political economy.
While scholars have explored the novelty of the ADA's mandate
broadly, with one extolling the interactive process as a "laudable
revolution" in workplace procedures, 13 the literature has generally
focused on definitional gatekeeping issues such as employers' undue

hardship defense, 14 courts' deference to employers as to the "essential
functions" of job descriptions, 15 and how to determine whether the
accommodation offered is "reasonable."1 6 Furthermore, divergent
12 The latest research into the shortcomings of accommodations attributes them to
employer uncertainty regarding the costs of an accommodation and ambiguity aversion,
particularly at hire. See generally Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Anticipating Accommodation,
105 IowA L. REV. 621 (2020). It instead identifies the failure to address employer
uncertainty as the ADA's "fatal flaw." Id. at 678; see also infra notes 334, 345 and
accompanying text (demonstrating employers' concerns and policy solutions for the costs
of accommodations). In a recent article, Katherine Macfarlane criticizes courts'
extratextual reliance upon the medical model of disability in requiring medical
documentation during the interactive process. Katherine A. Macfarlane, Disability Without
Documentation, 90 FoRDHAM L. REV. 59, 59-89 (2021). Previously, Stacy Hickox

examined bargaining over disability accommodations only from the lens of collective
bargaining by unions. See Stacy A. Hickox, Bargaining for Accommodations, 19 U. PA. J.

Bus. L. 147, 148 (2016).
13 Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Possibilitiesfor Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 616 (2004).

14 See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(10)(A)-(B) (defining employers' undue hardship defense); see

also, e.g., Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, supra note 9, at

89-90 (discussing the many considerations that comprise undue hardship); Steven B.
Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's FinancialHardship
Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 397

(1995) (introducing the article's focus on the financial components of undue hardship).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a "qualified individual"); see, e.g., Travis, Lashing
Back at the ADA Backlash, supra note 9, at 348 (highlighting relevant EEOC guidance);
Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 21-33 (2005) [hereinafter Travis,
Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment DiscriminationLaw] (discussing
the transformative and essentialist approaches to interpreting the ADA's accommodation

mandate, which both rely on the scope of a job's essential functions); Amy Knapp, The
Danger of the "EssentialFunctions" Requirement of the ADA: Why the Interactive Process

Should Be Mandated, 90 DENY. U. L. REV. 715, 731-35 (2013) (arguing that the use of an
essential functions requirement would undermine the purpose of the ADA). Even today,
employers continue to include clauses in job postings that purport to describe essential

functions of a job but operate to dissuade disabled applicants, such as a requirement that a
dean of fine arts must be able to lift twenty-five pounds. David M. Perry, Opinion, Job
Discrimination in Plain Print, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 10, 2016, 2:00 AM), http://

america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/2/job-discrimination-in-plain-print.html.
16 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing for "reasonable accommodations"). See
generally Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms-Reasonable Accommodation
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approaches to employment law and labor law doctrines have generated a blind spot in which the integration of people with disabilities is
relegated to "individual rights," to the exclusion of discourse around
intersecting hierarchies and organizational justice. 17

For people with disabilities, the availability of accommodations
may determine their livelihood, well-being, and ability to participate
with dignity "in the life of the community." 18 Examples of workplace
accommodations may include altering one's physical environment,
equipment, work schedule, or position, or by adjusting a company
policy. 19 Disability law's gradual approach thus paved the way for the
removal of ableist structures in public and private environments
nationwide 20 Yet disability's frameworks remain vastly underthe-

orized. Identifying as disabled signifies a social and legal identity that
implicitly demands institutional transformation-a potentially
broader view of disability than that of a status conferring an individual
and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMr. & LAB. L. 59 (2008) [hereinafter
Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms] (discussing reasonable accommodations and
advocating more involvement in the accommodations process for people with disabilities).
17 See, e.g., RAYMOND HOGLER, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 252 (2004) (urging "integrat[ion]" of labor and employment
laws that have been interpreted to conflict on account of varying policy concerns
originating from each); Robert A. Dubault, Note, The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing
Individual and Collective Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 1271 (1995) (demonstrating that Congress
provided stronger protections for the individual than the collective); Bradley A. Areheart,
Organizational Justice and Antidiscrimination, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1921, 1927 (2020)

(contending that antidiscrimination policies focused on the individual often fail, as opposed
to policies targeting the organization); infra notes 21, 131, 185-96 (discussing additional
DisCrit and organizational theory scholarship); see also infra note 41 (discussing the wane
of unionism and labor law in the wake of a shift to individualized and market-based
conceptions of rights).
18 Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts,

54 CALuF. L. REV. 841, 843 (1966) (arguing for the integration of people with disabilities in
the design of disability law). Jacobus tenBroek, a lawyer and human rights advocate,

founded the National Federation of the Blind, which advocated for antidiscrimination
protections in the workplace as integral to the "right to independence." DAVID
PETITNICCHIO, POLITICS OF EMPOwERMENT: DISABILITY RIGHTS AND THE CYCLE OF
AMERICAN POLICY REFORM 71 (2019).
19 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (providing examples of potential ADA "reasonable
accommodations").

20 The Architectural Barrier Act of 1968, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the ADA
aspire to transform public and private workspaces into accessible spaces, modeling a
gradual distributive approach. See, e.g., Doron Dorfman & Mariela Yabo, The
Professionalizationof Urban Accessibility, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213 (2020); SAMUEL R.
BAGENSTOS, LAw AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT

18-19 (2009) (arguing that disability rights advocates should fight to change society's
understanding of disability from a medical to a social model); Larry E. Craig, The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Prologue, Promise, Product, and Performance, 35 IDAHO

L. REV. 205, 207-11 (1999) (outlining the steady growth of legal protection for individuals
with disabilities).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

1832

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1826

right to be claimed. It is this tension between systemic change and
liberalism's individuated approach to civil rights that disability activists increasingly critique as they conceive of disability justice as robust,
with particular attention to co-constructed social identities, including

race. 2 1
The ADA's explicit focus on organizational justice coincided with
prominent calls by scholars in the early 2000s to address "second generation" workplace discrimination. 22 Second generation discrimination refers to exclusionary practices embedded in workplace
structures for which legal solutions are admittedly more elusive
because they require theories of liability that do not rely upon proof
of motive and intent, where courts have trained their focus on traditional statutes.2 3 Amid this shift in attention toward the structural, a
growing number of scholars and advocates in the last fifteen years

have proposed adopting the accommodations mandate as is for
requests related to pregnancy and childbirth, caregiving, religious
21 See, e.g., Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through a Critical Race Theoretical

Paradigm, 2 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 209, 210 (2011) (discussing ways
that disability is compounded to justify ideas of racial inferiority, further marginalize based
upon the health effects of environmental racism, and ground stereotypes regarding
incompetence and unworthiness); Mia Mingus, Changingthe Framework: DisabilityJustice,
LEAVING EVIDENCE (Feb. 12, 2011, 1:56 PM), https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/

02/12/changing-the-framework-disability-justice ("[Disability justice] work is about shifting
how we understand access, moving away from the individualized and independenceframed notions of access . . . and, instead, working to view access as collective and
interdependent."). On antidiscrimination law's elevation of the individual, see Deborah
Dinner, Beyond "Best Practices":Employment-Discrimination Law in the Neoliberal Era,

92 IND. L.J. 1059, 1066-67, 1069 (2017) and infra note 41. Yet resistance to the systemic
harms of segregation and institutionalization of people with disabilities has been
prominent in the confinement context for decades. ADA Title II litigation led the Supreme
Court to affirm the right to community-based treatment and discharge from state hospitals
based upon antidiscrimination theory. LIAT BEN-MOSHE, DECARCERATING DISABILITY:
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND PRISON ABOLITION 253-57 (2020) (discussing Olmstead v.

L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) and potential grounds for disability-conscious intersectional
coalitions with prisoners' rights and desegregation advocacy).
22 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural

Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465-79, 484 n.80 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination] (discussing a move towards structuralism in
antidiscrimination law); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward
a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91,
95-108 (2003) (discussing a number of structural and social changes that affect the manner

in which discrimination occurs).
23 See Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination, supra note 22, at 460
(explaining that second-generation claims involve exclusion that is not directly traceable to
intentional actions); Shirley Lin, Dehumanization "Because of Sex": The Multiaxial
Approach to the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 24 LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 731, 759-64
(2020) (observing that judicial disputes over the definitions of intent and motive limit the
reach of antidiscrimination law as a form of social regulation).
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practices, and other workers' needs. 24 A few intrepid commentators
have implied that the ADA's mandate is the best of the very narrow
options available among antidiscrimination tools. 25 Efforts to improve
the process through which accommodations are secured or to advance
public norms for dismantling ableist practices, however, are scant. 26
Meanwhile, state-facilitated avenues for collective action have
receded, leaving workers to shoulder the risk of illness and injury with
less leverage to assert their rights-a reality the COVID-19 pandemic
has thrown into sharp relief. 27
24 See, e.g., Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 1065, 117th Cong. (2021) (expanding
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) to require employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to workers who have limitations stemming from pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions absent undue hardship through processes identical to those for
workers with disabilities); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process:
Toward an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for
Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 30 [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Public Law and
Private Process] (proposing a new family-leave accommodation that adopts the ADA's
interactive process); Dallan F. Flake, Interactive Religious Accommodations, 71 ALA. L.
REV. 67, 73-74 (2019) (explaining that the interactive process is not statutorily mandated);
Stein et al., supra note 1, at 737-38, 750 (proposing to provide everyone who is workcapable with impairments with an accommodation, including the elderly, and preserving
the undue hardship analysis). Beyond the ADA interactive process framework, Sagit Mor

urges an approach combining the international principles of right of access and access to
justice for all groups through the philosophy of universal design: a "human diversity
approach" that "emphasizes the general ethical commitment to recognize, accept, and

integrate all groups in society, including persons with disabilities" and "challenges the
normal versus abnormal opposition and points at the power structures that turn a human
variation into a social and political difference." Sagit Mor, Essay, With Access and Justice
for All, 39 CARDozo L. REV. 611, 613, 623-24 (2017).
25 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The StructuralTurn and the Limits of AntidiscriminationLaw,
94 CALrF. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 41-42 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, The Structural Turn]
(noting courts' hostility to antisubordination approaches that target structurally located
discrimination, such as disparate impact doctrine, rather than intentional discrimination
may rest on background demands for employer fault that extend to accommodations law
as well); Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process,supra note 24, at 55 (calling the
accommodations mandate "[a]rguably the most aggressive of the federal equal
employment opportunity laws" despite "failing to achieve significant changes in work
structure").
26 After Jennifer Shinall's recent article, Anticipating Accommodation, supra note 12;
see also infra notes 334, 345 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of Shinall's
proposal), the closest proposal would expand the pool of individuals outside of strict
classes by focusing the ADA standard of reasonableness on the effectiveness of the
accommodation. Stein et al., supra note 1, at 737-38, 750 (proposing to provide everyone
with impairments unrelated to a disability with an accommodation as long as the ADA
deems it effective). It remains very much focused on the substantive breadth of the
mandate, however. On public norms and of the persistence of stigma, see infra Section
III.A.
27 Social inequalities are foregrounded in burgeoning protests nationwide and
widespread public concern over workplace safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. See,
e.g., Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz & Lauren Zumbach, Workers Now Deemed 'Essential' Want
More: How the Coronavirus Crisis Might Bring Permanent Labor Gains on Unionizing,
Sick Leave and Other Issues, CHL TRrn. (Apr. 13, 2020, 8:35 AM), https://
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The ultimate design of the interactive process is therefore a curiosity. It primarily relies on employees negotiating the implementation
28
of an entitlement -the merits of which the law presumes will also
become apparent to the parties through private discussion. The

EEOC devised the interactive process with little direction from
Congress, 2 9 and the agency's formal rule defines it as a private, collaborative exchange that would help parties identify an accommodation

30
once an employee disclosed a disability. The legal literature has
largely sidestepped inquiry into the dynamics of a law dependent
upon discriminatees negotiating with employers over compliance, and

whether this design might undermine a legislative guarantee for the
31
most vulnerable workers. Unlike settlement talks where parties bargain in the shadow of the law, expected to settle for less in light of the
uncertainty of litigation on the merits or a desire for expediency, the
parties bargain over the substance of a "mandate."
A bargaining frame is unsettling if we understand it to be a civil
rights mechanism to replace private ordering, yet it is implicit in the
law, and courts have deepened this framing within ADA jurisprudence without explicitly naming it.32 All the while, the interactive pro-

www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-coronavirus-worker-protections-sick-leave-

changes-20200410-je7jb4lrqfbovnl3uut4xe5yau-story.html; infra note 273.

28 See John Thibaut, Laurens Walker, Stephen LaTour & Pauline Houlden, Procedural
Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1275 (1974) (providing, in the context of actual
legal disputes, a taxonomy placing "bargaining" at the far end of the spectrum of dispute
resolution due to the full disputants' "total control" over the process and the absence of a
decisionmaker); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (illustrating the role of law in private
and
bargaining during divorce proceedings to settle cases through parties' exchange
951-52
at
id.
guarantees);
statutory
all
securing
than
rather
entitlements,
on
compromise
(observing that viewing divorce settlements from the perspective of "private ordering"
raises policy questions of emphasis, degree, and whether procedural and substantive

safeguards are needed).
29 See infra Section I.A.1 (explaining the difficulty in defining reasonable
accommodations under the ADA).
30 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
31 Instead, empirical studies by nonlegal disability experts have begun to document the
rates of denials of accommodations, and to only a limited extent through intersectional
inquiry, the demographic characteristics of who has access to ADA rights. See, e.g., infra

notes 148-54, 185-96 and accompanying text.
&

32 See infra Section I.B.2 and notes 86-89, 129, 322-28 and accompanying text; cf
Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 CORNELL J.L.
PUB. POL'Y 171, 177-80 (2005) (describing the process of drafting individualized education
programs between educators and families pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act as bargaining subject to market forces).
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cess has been universally accepted by courts, employers, and legal

practitioners for decades. 33
As many Americans have realized, the accommodations mandate
is illusory for those with low workplace bargaining power. 34 Between
47% and 58% of working-age Americans lacked a workplace accom-

modation but reported that they required one in order to work.35
More than one in four respondents who did request an accommodation were denied one by their employer. 36 The rates of denials are

higher among racial minorities, those with lower educational attainment, those in physically demanding jobs, and women, reflecting
extant social inequalities. 37 To deprive workers of access to accommodations undermines employees' job protection and workplace safety,
exacerbating the risk of further disability, illness, and death among
historically subordinated populations. 38 This alternative frame for
understanding accommodations law raises prescriptive implications
for fulfilling the mandate and others patterned after it. Reappraisal of
its design is all the more urgent as the community of people with disabilities is growing. One in four Americans will become disabled before
reaching age sixty-seven. 39
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview
of the accommodations mandate, the development of the formal regu33 As I discuss later, see infra note 63 and accompanying text, a one-size-fits-all
approach to an accommodations mandate is not possible given the sheer diversity of
disabilities, job functions, and worksites.
34 See infra Section II.A (detailing empirical findings of widespread inability to receive
accommodations).
35 Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen & Stephanie Rennane, Unmet Need for
Workplace Accommodation, 38 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGr. 1004, 1007 (2019) (including
respondents who were not working but would benefit from an accommodation that would
allow them to work in their estimate). This groundbreaking study attempts to break
through the historic logjam within U.S. Census survey methods that are unable to
disaggregate respondents with disabilities as defined by the ADA from those who are
working-age but are unable to work even with an accommodation. Id. at 1006, 1011, 1017
(implementing methodology to identify "accommodation-sensitive" individuals, i.e., those
"on the margin of working and not working depending on whether they are
accommodated").
36 Id. at 1020 tbl.6 (reflecting that twenty-six percent of respondents' requests for a
disability accommodation were denied).
37 See infra Section II.A.2.
38 See Andrea L. Steege, Sherry L. Baron, Suzanne M. Marsh, Cammie Chaumont
Men6ndez & John R. Myers, Examining OccupationalHealth and Safety Disparities Using
National Data: A Cause for Continuing Concern, 57 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 527, 534 tbl.IV
(2014) (reflecting Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries by, inter alia, race/ethnicity with
occupational homicide rate of .80 for Black, .87 for American Indian/Alaska Native/Asian/
Pacific Islanders, and .46 for Hispanic, compared with .27 for White/non-Hispanic).
39 Maestas et al., supra note 35, at 1004 (citing Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY
FACT SHEET (2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140706165531/http://www.ssa.gov/news/
press/factsheets/basicfact-alt.pdf).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

1836

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1826

lations defining the interactive process, and the bargaining-based
assumptions embedded in the ADA's statutory, regulatory, and decisional law. It then discusses the theoretical justifications for the

accommodations mandate as corrective justice and procedural justice.
Part II evaluates the legal design of the mandate against its record for
making accommodations available, particularly for workers with overlapping subordinated identities. It then provides an overview and critique of recent proposals to replicate the mandate to extend the reach

of accommodations for pregnancy, religious practice, caregiving, and
other workers' needs. Part III suggests new approaches that would
enhance workers' ability to access accommodations and employers'
ability to provide them. They are designed with an eye toward developing structural analysis, norms, regulation, and innovation at scale-

publicizing information gathering and access to detailed data
regarding precedent for accommodations by position and industry,
enhancing collective legal approaches to dismantling ableist struc-

tures, and expanding the social insurance model for accommodations.
After three decades of experience with the ADA, the universal
change it envisioned is not yet possible under the current framework.
The bipartisan success story that occasioned such a unique mandate

obscures the law's decollectivized conceptions of problem and process
upon implementation, and the challenges they pose to generating
40
public norms and changing attitudes. The ADA, and reforms that
would adopt its approach, center problem-solving by courts, institu-

tions ill-suited to provide prospective guidance on workplace restructuring for the vast array of future situations. The design critiques
advanced here point to the need to develop responsive state and systemic approaches, 4 1 with implications for civil rights, labor and
employment law, and organizational and regulatory theory.
As long as accommodations law is tethered to common-law negotiation and focused on market-mediated concepts such as employer
cost-forms of privatization of public law that constrain how far civil
40 See infra Part III.
41 Id. Unionism and labor law, the primary means of democratizing corporations, have
waned upon the rise of liberal ideology after World War II, and after Title VII instituted a
separate framework for antidiscrimination law that centered reliance on the judiciary. See
NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 187-91
(rev. & expanded ed. 2013); REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAw, AND
THE COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR LIBERALISM 7 (2015). By the ADA's passage in 1990, politics
further shifted to individualized and market-based conceptions of rights. See
PETTINICCHIO, supra note 18, at 5-8 (discussing the transformation of grassroots disability
rights movements' goals into institutional activism that met with "[n]eoliberal attitudes
about social and economic policy").
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rights sweep-expanding the mandate to new groups will not increase
access to accommodations where they may be needed most. 4 2

I
THE ACCOMMODATIONS MANDATE AS A NEW PROMISE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

The ADA was heralded as "a broad and remedial bill of rights for

individuals with disabilities" 4 3 addressing severe socioeconomic exclusion such that "no Americans will ever again be deprived of their
basic guarantee of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."44 The
extensive litigation 45 and scholarship 46 following its enactment predictably focused on the substantive definition of disability. In response
to the Supreme Court's unduly narrow interpretations of the term,

lawmakers passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),

significantly expanding the definition. 47 Reflecting dominant political
discourse at the time, much of the commentary around the mandate
revolved around a law and economics view of accommodations and
42 See also infra Section I.A.1 (discussing the undue hardship defense against provision
of accommodation); Section I.B.2 (discussing the EEOC's design of the ADA
accommodations mandate as ostensibly a hybrid of Title VII's religious accommodations
mandate and employers' NLRA duty to bargain in good faith a "private" collective
bargaining agreement). In future scholarship, I will elaborate on my framework of
workplace law as "privatized public law," identifying collectively beneficial workplace
organization and antidiscrimination obligations as a reconceptualization of commerce.
43 135 CONG. REC. S4984-87 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
44 President George Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (July 26, 1990), in 1 DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS wITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, PUBLIC LAW 101-336, Doc.
No. 9 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr., Peter J. McGovern & Jon S. Schultz eds., 1992).
45 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555

(1999); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
46 See Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash, supra note 9, at 312, 315-21
(observing that the backlash "is fueled, at least in part, by a belief that the ADA is a form
of targeted social welfare rather than a general antidiscrimination law, and that the ADA's
accommodations mandate gives employees with disabilities preferential treatment rather
than merely ensuring equal employment opportunities"); see also Krieger, supra note 9, at
503-14 (arguing that the ADA's expansive definition of disability contributed to the
perception of the accommodations mandate as a form of distributive rather than corrective
justice); Ruth Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1999) (discussing how media coverage of ADA
litigation has misled the public to believe the law is a "windfall statute for plaintiffs").
47 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The ADAAA
explicitly rejected the Supreme Court's narrow holdings in Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, and

Toyota, 534 U.S. 184. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(a)(3)-(7), 2(b)(2)-(6). But see
Deborah A. Widiss, Still Kickin' After All These Years: Sutton and Toyota as Shadow
Precedents, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 919, 936-45 (2015) (discussing the concerning trend among
courts of continuing to rely on superseded pre-ADAAA holdings).
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debated the rationality of shifting the costs of accommodations onto
employers. 48

But the original framework for the mandate and justifications for
the interactive process were in fact much broader. Section LA

describes the statutory and regulatory components of the process used
to evaluate an employee's accommodations request. Section I.B

reviews the theoretical justifications for the accommodations mandate
and interactive process as defined by Congress, the EEOC, and the
courts, as well as the broader commentary addressing workplace law
as organizational theory. I then contrast the ADA's institutional and

procedural design with the bold ambition of its mandate.
A.
1.

The Accommodations Mandate

Statutory Framework
The ADA was to be "a clear and comprehensive national man-

date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 49 The statute only briefly describes the mandate, however,
in a provision declaring that employers are to provide "reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee." 50 An employer is wholly excused from doing so if the
accommodation would "impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business." 51 The statute therefore places two limitations on the
mandate: (1) the accommodation must be considered "reasonable";
and (2) the accommodation cannot present an "undue hardship" to

the employer.5 2

48 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 230-64
(2000) (developing an economic model for wage and employment impacts of
accommodations mandates on subsets of workers); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination

and Groups,53 STAN. L. REv. 833, 834 (2001) (describing those who seek accommodations

under the ADA as making "claims" on "social resources" which "compete[]" with the
claims of others for those same resources); J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA
L. REv. 903, 905-27 (2003) (arguing that the ADA promotes labor market efficiency);
Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, supra note 9, at 85-155

(advancing a framework for assessing accommodation costs that marries the neoclassical
labor market model with social justice ideals).

49 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
50 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
51 Id.
52

Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"supra note 3, at 836-37 (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(b)(5)(A)) (describing the two concepts as distinct but related limitations upon the
reasonable accommodations mandate); see also US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,

399-402 (2002) (treating the two concepts as limitations upon the accommodations
mandate).
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The ADA's employment provisions drew criticism soon after passage as broad, vague, and difficult to apply. 53 Neither "reasonable"

nor "accommodation" are defined. The definitions section simply provides examples of possible accommodations: making "existing facili-

ties . . . accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities," or
offering modifications such as job restructuring, part-time or modified
schedules, reassignment, alterations to equipment, examinations,
training materials, or policies, provision of readers or interpreters, or
similar accommodations. 54 Only in the legislative history may we discern how Congress conceived the "reasonableness" of an accommodation: an accommodation is reasonable if it is "effective," i.e., whether
its implementation would allow the employee to perform the core
duties of the job. 55
By contrast, the statute provides extensive detail regarding the
"undue hardship" defense available to employers. Expanding upon an
earlier iteration of the defense under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, 56 the ADA ultimately defined undue hardship as "an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense," 57 enumerating at least four
53 See John Parry, Title I-Employment (agreeing with critics who labeled Title I as
"hard to interpret" despite arguing, ultimately, that its vagueness was the product of a
worthwhile tradeoff between "certainty" and "fairness" (citing Carolyn L. Weaver,
Disabilities Act Cripples Through Ambiguity, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1991, at A16)), in
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS wrITH DISABILITES Acr: RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES

57, 58 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993); Christine
M. Harrington, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The New Definition of Disability PostSutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 84 MARQ. L. REv. 251, 255 (2000) (noting that the
statute's vagueness prompted Congress to authorize the EEOC to clarify the meaning of
OF

ALL

AMERICANS

key terms).
54 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The EEOC later defined "reasonable accommodations" more
broadly through regulation. "Reasonable accommodation[s]" are "[m]odifications or
adjustments to a job application process" or "to the work environment, or to the manner
or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that
enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of
that position," or that otherwise allows an employee "with a disability to enjoy equal
benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated

employees without disabilities." 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(o)(1) (2020).

55 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 35 (1989) (noting that after the parties "[h]av[e]
identified one or more possible accommodations, the third informal step is to assess the
reasonableness of each in terms of effectiveness and equal opportunity" (emphasis added)).
But see Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-01 (declining to interpret "reasonable" to mean effective

in evaluating the reasonableness of an accommodation).
56 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (2020); see Chai R. Feldblum, The (R)evolution of Physical
Disability Anti-DiscriminationLaw: 1976-1996, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.

REP. 613, 614, 618 (1996) (describing how, in drafting the ADA, lawmakers substantially
borrowed the "undue hardship" defense from U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services regulations that succeeded the 1977 Health, Education and Welfare regulations

implementing Section 504).
57 42 U.S.C.

§

12111(10)(A).
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factors employers could rely on in determining whether providing an
accommodation would trigger the defense:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed ... ;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved . . . or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon
the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business ... with respect to the number of its employees;
the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce ... .58

The undue hardship factors do not require the parties to explore the
potential benefits an accommodation would provide to coworkers, to
59
the company, or to the public. Instead, they rest on short-term, zerosum assumptions about cost to the employer in providing an

accommodation.60
An undue hardship defense ensures that the accommodations

mandate does not operate as a mandate in practice, because the need
for an accommodation raised by the employee is effectively negotiated in relation to these factors. The defense did not appear in the
earliest version of the ADA, but represented a watering down of the
mandate as the bill wound its way through debate. As originally introduced, the law would only have excused the employer from providing
an accommodation if it would' have been catastrophic and
61
"threaten[ed] the existence of" the employer's business. The statute
58 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(10)(B).

&

59 See generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
839 (2008) [hereinafter Emens, Integrating Accommodation]; id. at 841 (providing
examples of immediately wider benefits of employers installing a ramp, using ergonomic
furniture that reduces strain, and installing an air filter to improve air quality).
60 The ADA's individualized assessments have discouraged group-based theories to
advance structural change and broad-based accommodations. Michael Ashley Stein
Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, DisparateImpact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861,

867, 879-82 (2006). Unlike Title VII, the ADA does not have a general statutory disparate

impact cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). In Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, the
Court opined that "disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the ADA," but the case

did not involve an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim. 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003). In the

absence of the Supreme Court holding otherwise, Stein and Waterstone have persuasively
argued that although the ADA focuses on individuals, the statute does not foreclose the
viability of general ADA disparate impact claims. Stein & Waterstone, supra.
61 Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"supra note 3, at 836 n.28 (quoting S. 2345,

100th Cong. § 7(a)(1) (1988)). The undue hardship defense was added to the employment

title of the ADA in 1989, and several factors to determine what constitutes undue hardship

were added in 1990 before passage. Ruth Colker, The ADA's Journey Through Congress,
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 13, 31 (2004) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990)). An
amendment to provide a presumption of undue hardship if the cost of an accommodation
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ultimately focused on whether the employer must accommodate an

employee's disability, not what the process should look like. This
omission is surprising in light of the profoundly different kind of compliance the ADA expected of employers. Unlike, for example, the
mandate that employers pay into Social Security on behalf of their
employees, 62 this mandate requires employers to interact directly with
each worker to remediate a barrier in a time-sensitive manner.
The legislative history yields very little about the interactions
Congress expected to unfold. Understandably, given the sheer diversity of disabilities, job functions, and worksites, a one-size-fits-all
approach to an accommodations mandate was not possible. 63 During
Congressional debate, lawmakers simply expressed that a "problemsolving approach should be used to identify the particular tasks or
aspects of the work environment that limit performance and to identify possible accommodations." 64 The Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources expressed a general expectation that
"employers first will consult with and involve the individual with a
disability in deciding on the appropriate accommodation." 65 But the
final text only referred to this consultation by way of another defense
provision: employers that negotiate an accommodations request in
"good faith" would not be liable for any damages if they ultimately do
not accommodate the employee. 66 "Good faith" was yet another term

the ADA left undefined.
"exceeds 10 percent of the salary or the annualized hourly wage of the job in question" was
criticized as too generous, too arbitrary, and contrary to the ADA's purpose of assisting
low-wage workers, and was rejected from the final bill. Id. at 37-38 (quoting 136 CONG.

REC. 10,903 (1990)).
62 26 U.S.C. § 3111.

63 As I argue in Part III, the state can and should play a role in understanding
mesolevel environments that may be specific to industries and types of limitations, i.e., a lifting
restriction. In addition, as Ruth Colker has argued, the law can set default expectations for
modifications that facilitate universal design. See generally Ruth Colker, The Americans
with DisabilitiesAct Is Outdated, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 787 (2015) (arguing that employment
and education should be required to adhere to baseline standards for information
technology to avoid harms to people with disabilities who must make retrofitting requests).
64 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 (1989); see also
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990),

as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 348; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.9 app. at 423 (outlining the

"problem-solving approach" employers should use). Katherine Macfarlane observes that a
benefit of keeping the process informal may be that fewer people with disabilities would be
denied accommodations due to lack of medical documentation. See Macfarlane, supra note
12, at 20, 32. As discussed infra Sections I.B.2 and III.A, my critique addresses the lack of
procedural justice and organizational fairness in the process.
65 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34.
66 The damages provision is fairly circular and vague, providing an award only against
defendants that fail to "demonstrate[] good faith efforts, in consultation with the person
with the disability ... to identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would
provide . .. an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the
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Regulatory Addition of the Interactive Process

Despite the unique nature of the accommodations mandate,
lawmakers decided to delegate to the EEOC the task of determining
67
how it would be implemented. The ADA did not specify any proce-

that
dure in connection with the mandate, but lawmakers understood
remediation would generally happen at the initiative of an employee
employer. 68
who discloses the need for an accommodation to their

regulations that
Thus, a year after the law's passage, the EEOC issued
announced an "interactive process.1"69 The agency outlined the goals
of the process as identifying the disabled employee's job limitations
for
and then discovering the accommodations that would be effective

do the statute, regulations, or case
operation of the business." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3). Nor
Introducing good faith as the

law expressly refer to other doctrines to define "good faith."
mandate. Colker,
measure for employers' efforts further weakened the accommodations

that the good
supra note 61, at 16; see infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (noting
comply, and
to
failure
for
consequences
clear
lacks
defined,
poorly
faith standard has been
creates additional obligations for employees). A year before the ADA's passage, EEOC
advocate who used a
Commissioner Evan Kemp (a prominent Republican disability rights
as follows:
standard
faith
good
wheelchair) responded to probing regarding the
Mr. JONTZ. What would be your response to whether [differentiating
not,
between a good faith effort and a non-good faith effort] is desirable or

based on your experience with EEOC and some of the problems relating to
this whole area?
that the first
Mr. KEMP. I think that we have to realize that it is a process,
Then you make
determination is whether the person is a handicapped person.

To do this
a determination of whether he is a qualified handicapped person.
do the job with
can
he
if
see
and
job
the
at
look
and
limitations
his
at
you look
can

accommodation
or without an accommodation. Then you determine if the
an undue burden. So, it is a
it
is
available,
is
it
if
and
available,
it
is
or
be given
they go through
process, and I don't think that corporationswhich can show that
that a person in a
that process will be held liable for anything. But if they think
and another on a
wheelchair is mentally retarded and has one foot in the grave
look at the
banana peel and don't hire him for that reason, and don't
liable.
held
be
should
they
individual, then I think
on H.R. 2273 Before the
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearing
H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 101st
the
of
Educ.
Select
&
Opportunities
Emp.
on
Subcomms.
(statement of Evan J. Kemp,
Cong. 18 (1989) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (emphasis added)
Commission).
Opportunity
Employment
Equal
States
United
Jr., Comm'r,
67 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (authorizing the EEOC to implement regulations); see also Flake,
and noting that although
supra note 24, at 74-75 (reviewing the Senate Committee report
understood the statute
statutory text does not reference interactive process, the Committee
of the process).
stage
every
at
together
work
to
to require employers and employees
text.
accompanying
and
77-78
notes
68 See discussion infra
the Commission
69 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2020). If any of the 697 public comments
process, the
received in response to the proposed rule criticized the interactive

Equal Employment
promulgation of the Final Rule omitted any mention of them. See
(July 26, 1991) (codified
35,726
Reg.
Fed.
56
Disabilities,
with
Individuals
for
Opportunity
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
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both parties.70 Surprisingly, although the regulations and supplemental interpretive guidance use the word "may" in relation to using
the interactive process, a majority of circuits have since declared the
process to be mandatory. 7 1

Courts have been uncharacteristically enthusiastic toward the
EEOC's regulations defining the interactive process. Perhaps the support could be attributed to the weight courts allocate to agency interpretation after applying Chevron deference. 72 But the likelier motives
for transforming an otherwise permissive private process into a

mandatory one were to advance judicial economy and abide by a his70 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, app. at 423; see also S. REP. No. 101-116,
at 34-35 (describing the same).
71 See Echevarrfa v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119, 133
(1st Cir. 2017) (treating
the interactive process as a potential "duty" prompted by a request for an ADA
accommodation (quoting Ortiz-Martfnez v. Fresenius Health Partners, 853 F.3d 599, 605

(1st Cir. 2017))); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 315-16 (3d Cir. 1999)

(explaining how the employer's obligation to "take some initiative" is inherent in the
notion of an interactive process, and that "the process must be interactive because each
party holds information the other does not"); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp. Inc., 93 F.3d
155,
165 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the employee's request for an accommodation
automatically "triggers" an "obligation" on the part of the employer to "participate in the
interactive process"); Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1041 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing
Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 929 (6th Cir. 2013); and then citing Breitfelder v.
Leis, 151 F. App'x 379, 386 (6th Cir. 2005)) (declaring the interactive process "mandatory"
and an independent violation of the ADA if the plaintiff proposed a reasonable
accommodation); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir.
1996) ("The employer has to meet the employee half-way, and if it appears that the
employee may need an accommodation but doesn't know how to ask for it, the employer
should do what it can to help."); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am. Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th
Cir. 1999) (holding that when an employer receives an accommodation request, "it
becomes necessary to initiate the interactive process"); Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n,
239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (treating an employer's engagement in the interactive
process as a "mandatory obligation" under the ADA); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180
F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that notice of a need for accomodation
triggers the employer's interactive-process obligation and that "[t]he obligation to engage
in an interactive process is inherent in the statutory obligation to offer a reasonable
accommodation"). But see Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285-86 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the plaintiff must show the availability of a reasonable accommodation to
trigger the employer's obligation to participate in the interactive process).
72 In Congress's general discussion of parties problem-solving an accommodations
request, courts may have surmised support for the concept so as to grant Chevron
deference to the agency's position. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute" to be entitled to "controlling weight"). Moreover,
unlike Title VII where the EEOC was granted only procedural rulemaking authority,
Congress granted the EEOC substantive rulemaking authority as to the ADA in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12116. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) ("We have recognized a
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.").
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toric deference to employers' discretion in organizing workplace
of a
structures. As one court opined, the interactive process "is more
for
allow
to
mechanism
a
clearly
is
labor tool than a legal tool ... . It
73
The
forum."
legal
early intervention by an employer, outside of the
debut of the interactive process thus elicited praise as a "revolutionary
a form of
change in workplace procedural norms," requiring
ultimately
is
employer-employee dialogue even if the accommodation
74
denied.
Dallan Flake traces the idea for the interactive process to a 1989
75
Senate Committee report. The Committee was fairly optimistic

and
about an easy flow of conversation between the employer
76
employee regarding the disability and a solution. The presumption
disaof a dialogue appeared to be a sound one. Unless the employee's

bility is "known," i.e., obvious or previously disclosed to the employer,

it is the employee who typically initiates an accommodations request
77
Congress contemby revealing a disability. As Flake describes it,
plated an interaction between equals that would encourage
seeker
employers to "consult with and involve" the accommodation
because she "may have a lifetime of experience identifying ways to
and
accomplish tasks differently in many different circumstances"
accomof
type
would thus be best positioned to identify the precise

modation needed.

. .

. [T]he employee's suggested accommodation

the
is often simpler and less expensive than the accommodation
for
situation
employer may have envisioned, resulting in a win-win
78
the employee and employer.

Lawmakers further assumed that the accommodations mandate
that was individualwould manifest in workplaces through a "process"
79 The decentralized
ized and bottom-up, rather than top-down.
see also Deane
73 Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002);
the interactive
that
(noting
banc)
(en
1998)
Cir.
(3d
v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 149
process serves to prevent unnecessary litigation).
views the benefits
74 Befort, supra note 13, at 616, 619. Another commentator largely
to bias-based
transparency
and
resistance"
for
tools
"exacting
providing
as
of the exchange
See Basas,
perfect.
not
is
process
denials of accommodation, while noting the interactive
110-12.
at
16,
note
supra
Rooms,
Board
Back Rooms,
took place in the
75 Flake, supra note 24, at 74. Even less discussion of the process
reprinted in 1990
as
(1990),
39
at
3,
pt.
101-485,
No.
REP.
H.R.
Representatives.
House of
persons with
the
and
employers
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 462 ("Consultations between
to perform the
order
in
required
is
what
of
assessment
accurate
an
in
result
will
disabilities
job duties.").
76 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 (1989).

77 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

78 Flake, supra note 24, at 74 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34).
reasonable
79 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 ("The Committee believes that the
to a
barriers
which
in
process
a
as
understood
best
is
accommodation requirement
(emphasis added));
particular individual's equal employment opportunity are removed."
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approach is evident in the ADA's employment title, Title I, which
deviates from Title VII in that it does not include a generic disparate

impact provision. 80 Nor does it address the possibility of group-based

requests for accommodations. 81 Congress viewed information sharing
between individual parties as the main engine of ADA compliance,
without attempting to address the structural barriers workers with disabilities as a whole would encounter.
Thus, the final regulations generally instruct the parties to "identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential

reasonable accommodations" to overcome them. 82 Interpretive guidance thereafter outlines four steps intended to set up a give-and-take
to promote collaboration and information sharing between the parties, directing employers to:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose
and essential functions;
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the pre-

cise job-related limitations imposed by the individual's disability
and how those
accommodation;

limitations could be overcome with a reasonable

(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify
potential accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would
have in enabling the individual to perform the essential functions of
the position; and

see also Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg.

35,726, 35,739 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) ("[T]he determination of
whether an individual is qualified for a particular position must necessarily be made on a
case-by-case basis. . . . [A]n accommodation must be tailored to match the needs of the
disabled individual with the needs of the job's essential functions."), amended by
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 17,003 (Mar. 25, 2011).

80 A disparate impact provision within the ADA appears in the context of employers'
use of qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection or screening criteria
unless they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
But see supra note 60 (noting a disparate impact claim under the ADA is not foreclosed by
statutory silence, and the Court has signaled approval of the theory).
81 The ADA presently discourages all stakeholders from addressing modifications at a
larger scale. It holds employers to tight confidentiality provisions, from prohibiting inquiry
into whether an employee has a disability or the nature of the disability unless it is job-

related or consistent with business necessity, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), to limiting use of
information derived from medical tests or inquiries, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
Conversely, employees who voluntarily disclose information about their disabilities with
coworkers may not be able to control adverse use of the information by their employers.
See Harris, Taking Disability Public, supra note 11, at 1726 (describing disability law as
"overvaluing privacy" at the expense of "an accurate picture of the breadth of disability in
society").

82 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2020).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

1846

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1826

(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated

is most approand select and implement the accommodation that
83
priate for both the employee and the employer.

These interactive requirements are only subject to the common-

law guardrail: a standard of good faith. Like Congress, the EEOC did
not address what constitutes "good faith," yet employers may avoid
any damages for a failure to accommodate if they abide by that

standard during the interactive process.84 As a result, jurisdictions

have developed widely variable interpretations as to what constitutes

good faith and whether failure to participate in the ADA interactive

process supports a substantive violation of the broader duty to
85
accommodate.
The concept is most reminiscent of an employer's duty to bargain
86
with a union in good faith. In labor law, this duty has been interto
preted to merely require the parties-usually the employers-not

bargain in bad faith. 87 A growing number of courts have used findings

of bad faith by employees during the interactive process to preclude
the employee from prevailing on the merits of a failure-toaccommodate claim, thus extending the good-faith obligation bilaterally. 88 This maneuver expands traditional common-law understand83 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 423.
84 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3); see supra note 66 and accompanying text.

85 Much of the law is piecemeal as courts generate a common law of the interactive
Inc., 228
process, and thus would not be accessible to a layperson. E.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air,

the
F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding employer failure to participate in
ADA
interactive process may preclude it from obtaining summary judgment on an
v.
Ballard
(2002);
407
391,
U.S.
535
grounds,
accommodation claim), vacated on other

Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding the same and that such failure was prima
facie evidence of bad faith under the ADA); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789,

was
805 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding no bright-line rule exists for determining if a party
239 F.3d
responsible for failure of interactive process); Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n,

1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding an employer's obligation to engage in the interactive

when the
process extends beyond the first attempt at accommodation and continues
the initial
employee seeks a different accommodation or where the employer is aware
accommodation was ineffective); see also supra note 66, infra notes 128-29, 180-81, 204
and accompanying text.

86 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d).
87 See KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT, MARTIN H. MALIN, ROBERTO L. CORRADA,
CHRISTOPHER D. CAMERON & CATHERINE L. FISK, LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY

Board
WORKPLACE 653, 663 (3d ed. 2019) (describing the National Labor Relations
make
interpretations of Section 8(d)'s obligation to exclude any requirement that parties
any concessions).
88 E.g., Dep't of Fair Emp. & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 742-43 (9th
to
Cir. 2011) (holding an employee failed to participate in the interactive process by failing
be held
propose an alternative accommodation, and therefore the defendant could not
of the
liable); Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115 ("[C]ourts should attempt to isolate the cause

...
break-down [in the interactive process] and then assign responsibility so that liability

Beck v.
ensues only where the employer bears responsibility for the breakdown." (quoting
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ings of good faith by treating the interactive process itself as

embedded in an employment contract, rather than a civil rights mandate correcting for private ordering. Of course, the parties could
receive legal advice from counsel about interactive process obligations
to avoid missteps, but this is far less likely to be true for employees. 89

Antidisability animus that follows employees' disclosure of their
disabilities during the interactive process is not addressed in the procedural aspects of the rules. Status-based disability discrimination is

prohibited in other provisions of the ADA.9 0 Thus, in practice,
employees disclose disabilities in a manner least likely to generate
stigma or retaliation because the risk of hostility remains high. 91 Once
Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135-37 (7th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (second alteration in original)); cf IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS,
STUDIES IN CONTRAcr LAw 707-08 (9th ed. 2017) (describing the parties' mandatory duty
of good faith in performing a contract); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811 (1982)
("[A]lthough the general duty of good faith and fair dealing is no more than a minimal
requirement (rather than a high ideal), its relevance in contractual matters is peculiarly
wide-ranging, and it rules out many varieties of bad faith in a diverse array of contexts.").
89 While comprehensive data on access to counsel for employees with disabilities would
be hard to obtain, a rough proxy would be the number of EEOC charges filed under the
ADA, solely or concurrently, as a prerequisite to mediation or litigation. While some of
these employees may be pro se, only 24,324 such charges were filed in FY 2020. Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges (Charges Filed with EEOC) (Includes
Concurrent Charges with Title VII, ADEA, EPA, and GINA) FY 1997- FY 2020, U.S.
EQUAL

EMP.

OPPORTUNITY

COMM'N,

https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/americans-

disabilities-act-1990-ada-charges-charges-filed-eeoc-includes-concurrent (last visited Aug.
19, 2021). This figure reflects only a modest rise from the 18,108 charges with ADA claims
the EEOC received in FY 1997. Id. As discussed supra note 36 and infra note 156,
approximately 642,900 Americans have requested disability accommodations and
approximately twenty-six percent are denied one entirely.

90 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a). As to timing, the ADA does prohibit inquiries about the

existence, nature, or severity of any disability at the interview stage. Id. § 12212(d)(2). It
also prohibits discrimination against individuals with a record of impairment, which may
also be implicated by virtue of an employee having sought an accommodation from their
employer. Id. § 12102(1)(b).
91 See, e.g., infra note 212 and accompanying text; see also
Sarah von Schrader,
LaWanda Cook & Wendy Strobel Gower, Creating an Accommodating Workplace:
Encouraging Disability Disclosure and Managing Reasonable Accommodation Requests
("Carefully planning when and how much to share about one's disability is a strategy
employees use to increase the likelihood of a positive response." (first citing Alecia M.
Santuzzi, Pamela R. Waltz, Lisa M. Finkelstein & Deborah E. Rupp, Invisible Disabilities:
Unique Challengesfor Employees and Organizations,7 INDUS. & ORG. PSYCH. 204, 204-19
(2014); then citing Sarah von Schrader, Valerie Malzer & Susanne Bruybre, Perspectiveson
Disability Disclosure: The Importance of Employer Practices and Workplace Climate, 26
EMP. REsPs. & RTS. J. 237, 237-55 (2014) [hereinafter von Schrader et al., Perspectives on
Disability Disclosure])), in EMPLOYMENT AND DISABILITY:

ISSUES, INNOVATIONS,

AND

OPPORTUNITIES 99, 105 (Susanne M. Bruyere ed., 2019) [hereinafter von Schrader et al.,
Creating an Accommodating Workplace]. Estimates of the rate of negative responses
following a disclosure or request for an accommodation (including retaliation) are difficult
to pinpoint. In a recent survey, 10% of those who reported disclosing their disability at
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denied an accommodation that they should have received, those
without an intermediary to facilitate compliance with the ADA must

resort to legal process to enforce their rights and exhaust agency remedies.9 2 They must be willing to act as private attorneys general to
93
enforce the mandate through legal action, as alternative dispute res-

olution is not offered by the EEOC until an employee files an admin94
istrative charge.
In light of the EEOC's predominant role in implementing the

mandate, it may be tempting to try to improve the interactive process
through rulemaking alone. The next Section examines the extent to
which accommodations law and the disability framework instead may
or may not fulfill a broader public responsibility for remediating
ableism. The underlying rationale for the accommodations mandate

extends

our task from diagnosing barriers to understanding

approaches that have been avoided, undertheorized, or only modestly

implemented.

work rated their "immediate disability disclosure experience as negative," and 24% rated
Von
"the longer term consequences of the disability disclosure experience as negative."
less
Schrader et al., Perspectives on Disability Disclosure, supra, at 249. Employees with
experiences
disclosure
negative
experience
to
apparent disabilities were more likely

relative to those with very apparent disabilities. Id. at 250 tbl.5 (listing 10.6% versus 6.9%

negative immediate disclosure experiences, and 26.9% versus 19.8% longer-term disability
disclosure experiences, respectively); Santuzzi et al., supra, at 206, 212-13 (concluding that
employees with disabilities that are "invisible," i.e., that are non-obvious and require
disclosure such as mental disabilities, continue to weigh a "high risk" of potential stigma
that accompanies supervisors' and coworkers' knowledge of the disability against the
work-related and other benefits of disclosing their condition at work). A 2017 study
similarly found that 91% of employees with disabilities who disclosed to a supervisor
received either a "positive" or "neutral" response. LaWanda Cook, The Workplace
Disclosure Dilemma, ABILrrY MAG., Aug.-Sept. 2017, at 42, 42 tbl.X (noting the
the
proportion of 59% positive plus 25% neutral responses from a supervisor relative to

92% of survey respondents who did disclose their disability).
92 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and thereby establishing
filing of an agency charge, a prerequisite for litigation).

93 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975). Although Albemarle

addressed Title VII litigants, the EEOC enforces Title VII and ADA Title I employment
rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating into ADA Title I sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5,
2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of Title VII's enforcement provisions).
94 Mediation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNrrY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/

mediation (last visited Aug. 24, 2021) (discussing offer of voluntary mediation with the

EEOC only after a party has filed a charge of discrimination); see also infra note 266
(describing the political rise of private enforcement of rights and fragmented policy that
results).
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Civil Rights Justificationsfor the Accommodations Mandate

Mandate as Corrective Justice
The duty to accommodate contrasts with civil rights laws enacted

during the Rights Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, which generally
prohibit employers from acting upon a social status. 95 Under "traditional" antidiscrimination law, employer conduct that consciously
relies upon protected statuses typically arises only as affirmative remedies after a determination of liability. 96 This distinction has caused
scholars and critics of the ADA to characterize it as redistributive
rather than antidiscriminatory. 97 Others view the accommodations
mandate as a form of corrective justice, 98 and, as discussed below, the
ADA itself advances this view. How the mandate is justified very
much matters as it bears on how employers, employees, and the public
view employers' obligations to change their practices and how aggressively the mandate should be implemented. 99
Sam Bagenstos has argued that the accommodations mandate is
antidiscrimination law, rather than a substantially different kind of
law, merging both corrective and distributive justice arguments.10 0 He
and others rely upon arguments from feminist scholars who considered accommodations necessary to ensure equality-most prominently in the pregnancy context-because both approaches "aim to
overcome systematic patterns of stigma and subordination" by
targeting occupational segregation and other structural sources of inequality.1 01 Requiring accommodations that provide employees with
95 Bagenstos, "RationalDiscrimination,"supra note 3, at 826-30, 828 n.9.

96 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (providing court remedy to "order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay... , or any other equitable relief as the court deems

appropriate").
97 E.g., Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REv. 833,

836-37 (2001); Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil:
Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability
DiscriminationLaw, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 75 (1999) (calling the accommodations mandate

"affirmative action" for people with disabilities); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 10-11

(1996) (arguing that reasonable accommodations require employers to consider disability
under a "difference model").
98 See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 9, at 504; see also infra Section I.B.2.
99 Krieger, supra note 9, at 504-05; Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S.
Disability Law and the ADA Amendments Act, 60 AM. J. CompAR. L. 205-06, 219-21

(2012).
100 Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"supra note 3, at 828-30, 859-70.
101 Id. at 830; see also Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out of
the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1120-21 (1986) ("Most

feminists agree that one of the crucial issues to be addressed in order to eliminate the
economic and social subordination of women . . . is to make the workplace more
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disabilities the same opportunities afforded to those without disabili102
because preserving ableist
ties is necessary to achieve equality

structures is discriminatory-and therefore normatively undesirable.
Bagenstos offers the metaphor of the baseline to support the theory

that the mandate is not redistributive, but corrective:
If .. . antidiscrimination law simply restores a just distribution but
accommodation redistributes, then one must assume that any distribution reflecting intentional discrimination is unjust and therefore

an inappropriate baseline for a determination of whether redistribution is occurring.... [But] why can we not say the same thing about
a distribution reflecting the creation of institutions inaccessible to
people with disabilities (i.e., one reflecting the lack of accommodation)? By this account, accommodation requirements (like antidiscrimination requirements) simply restore a just distribution; they do
not "redistribute." 103
A comparison of doctrinal tools further illustrates how the ADA

is not radically different.104 Christine Jolls observed that in addition to
some kinds of pregnancy accommodations, Title VII disparate impact
doctrine requires employers to affirmatively alter certain practices to
accommodate the needs of groups to ensure equal treatment, such as
105 Because the mandate
in job-selection criteria and grooming rules.
often requires correcting earlier decisions by an employer, "whether
accommodating to pregnancy and parenting needs."); Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N.
Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning
of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513, 559-60 (1983) ("[B]ecause

members of different . . . sexual groups manifest normative differences in height, weight,
history of arrests or completion of high school, equal treatment of members of these
different groups under a selection procedure based on any of the above criteria is not likely
to result in equality of effect."). Further breaking down the dichotomy is the current
colloquial understanding of affirmative action as encompassing policies and practices
designed to promote equality "in ways not strictly required by antidiscrimination law
alone," including those "designed to respond to past discrimination, prevent current

discrimination, and promote certain societal goals such as social stability or improved

pedagogy." Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1063, 1063-64, 1064 n.3 (2006).
102 Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"supra note 3, at 860 (citing US Airways, Inc.

v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)). Richard Epstein is the most vocal opponent of the ADA
and other protective employment laws for workers with disabilities, on grounds that they
interfere with the market. But even Epstein acknowledges the "dominant social view today

rejects out of hand any return to a market solution" and treats "all existing discrimination
regulation as sacrosanct." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 484-85 (1992).

THE CASE

103 Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"supra note 3, at 862.
104 See Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115

HARV. L. REv. 642, 653-66 (2001) (arguing that accommodation and antidiscrimination
are overlapping concepts).
105 Id. at 644, 653-68.
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conscious or simply uncaring," that employer must make the effort to
understand and correct the original error.106
The ADA itself justifies the mandate under the corrective justice
framework. The statute expressly requires employers to incorporate

accommodations without legal process by defining "discriminate" to
include "not making reasonable accommodations to [address] the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability."1 07 EEOC regulations furthered this approach
by elaborating on the statutory definition of reasonable accommodation-a broadly illustrative definition-to one that highlights
outcome-driven equality.1 08 A catch-all provision of the rule defines
reasonable accommodation to include actions that allow an employee
with a disability to "enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without

disabilities." 109
Even as the corrective justice view of the mandate is now amply
represented in the scholarship, it is a different question entirely
whether the ADA's design sufficiently matches the ambition of its
mandate.11 0 Some employers, courts, and commentators have resisted

the ADA's corrective justice approach. They describe the accommo'

dations mandate as targeted social welfare in the form of cost shifting
onto employers, with their arguments well reprised in the literature.1 1
To combat hostility towards accommodations, reforms must afford

more meaningful guardrails between a subordinated party and an
106 Krieger, supra note 9, at 504, 504

n.97.
107 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
108 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (2020).
109 Id. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii).
110 See Krieger, supra note 9, at 505-06 (noting that disability's extensive history with
the welfare state contributes to controversy over the accommodations mandate when
viewed as imposing privilege, entitlement, and obligation) (citing DEBORAH A. STONE,
THE DISABLED STATE 28 (1984)); cf discussion infra Section II.B (noting the Supreme
Court's adoption of the defendant employer's framework that affirmatively obligating
employers to accommodate pregnancy-related conditions would create a "most-favored
nation status" (quoting Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment
Discrimination:From Unjustified Impact to DisparateTreatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105
GEO. L.J. 559, 560-61 (2017)).
111 Krieger, supra note 9, at 516 (noting large segments of the public, including many
judges, do not view the ADA as an antidiscrimination statute but rather a social welfare
benefits program like social security disability); Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note
25, at 3-4, 41-42 (noting that the reach of accommodations law, as with other

antidiscrimination doctrines, may rest on judges' background demands that fault is
attributable to the employer); cf Verkerke, supra note 48, at 932 (noting the political

popularity of unfunded mandates in antidiscrimination law, as they do not require raising
tax revenue). See generally Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations,

supra note 9 (suggesting how society should conceptualize
accommodation costs from law-and-economics perspectives).

disability-related
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employer to secure remediation. These guardrails are particularly
important in organizations where exclusionary structures are the most

entrenched.
2.

Mandate as ProceduralJustice

In addition to its substantive contributions, the accommodations
112
because it instigated
mandate has been termed a "quiet revolution"
millions of private dialogues about workplace barriers. Stephen Befort
celebrated the interactive process as a development that "significantly
transformed procedural structures and norms" affecting people with
disabilities. 113 Employers are expected to address requests for accom11 4
A 1989 report from the
modations voluntarily and "expeditiously."
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources declared that discussions over an accommodation should be structured as collaborative
"problem-solving." 115 But Congress's description remained at a high
level of generality, without advancing any structural framework. Such

an open-ended method for exploring accommodations, and the underlying question of the employee's standing to request one, carries the
potential for wider conflict.11 6 Requests for a workplace accommodation ask employers to change their position to resolve the rights of the
employee. The policy's acknowledgment that the interactive process
117
requires collaboration belies the need for fairness to create access.
112 Befort, supra note 13, at 628.
113 Id. In a somewhat different vein, Linda Hamilton Krieger believes public resentment
toward the ADA also arises from the obligatory function of the interactive process as a
deviation from the absence of procedural justice in most workplaces. Krieger, supra note 9,
at 506.
114 The EEOC enforcement guidance urges employers to respond "expeditiously" to a
request for an accommodation and engage in an interactive process, if necessary, "as
quickly as possible." U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, No. 915.002,
GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
THE AMERICANS WrrH DISABILIrIES Acr (2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/

ENFORCEMENT

UNDER

guidance/enforcement-guidance-reasonable-accommodation-and-undue-hardship-underada. Thereafter, an employer should "act promptly to provide the reasonable

accommodation" as "[u]nnecessary delays can result in a violation of the ADA." Id.
115 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990),

as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 348; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.9 app. at 423 (outlining the
problem-solving approach employers should use).
116 See Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale,

14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 57-60 (2009) (including workplace rights-based disputes as a
"problem of scale" in organizational justice); Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict
Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DIsp. RESOL. 1, 7 (observing that many problems
presented as "individual" conflicts are rooted in policies, organizational practices, or
systems affecting broader groups with respect to resolution required).
cooperative
117 More cynically, the Ninth Circuit opined that "[t]his rule fosters the ...

.

problem-solving contemplated by the ADA, by encouraging employers to seek . .
accommodations that really work, and by avoiding the creation of a perverse incentive for
employees to request the most drastic and burdensome accommodation possible out of

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 2021]

BARGAINING FOR INTEGRATION

1853

As a mandatory dialogue, the interactive process determines the substantive rights of employees with disabilities even if no specific out-

come is preordained.
In social psychology, "procedural justice" examines decisionmaking and interpersonal functions of procedures between individ-

uals, including bargaining.11 8 Studies in workplace organizational
psychology reflect employees' desire for procedural fairness in addition to substantive outcomes11 9 as a means of mediating their identities.120 External laws, in turn, provide the bounds of acceptable
decisionmaking and practice. 1 2 1 Most courts took it upon themselves
to refine the interactive process to not only require good faith by both
parties, as noted above, but also to rein in the relatively unfettered
discretion of employers over outcomes.1 22 But whether the interactive
process was intended to be a form of procedural justice or came to
approximate one after decades of judicial refinement, for too long it
has been a neglected experiment in civil rights.
The accommodations mandate incentivizes employers to create
compliance structures and engage employees-at some level-in light
of the external law of the ADA, but in an era when comprehensive
fear that a lesser accommodation might be ineffective." Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n,

239 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).
118 E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER,

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL

JUSTICE 61-65 (1988); accord Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, The Group Engagement

Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERS. & SOC.
PSYCH. REV. 349, 350 (2003). In corollary scholarship regarding procedural justice within

&

legal dispute resolution, a foundational taxonomy places "bargaining" at the far end of the
spectrum where disputants have primary control over the process and a third-party
decisionmaker is absent. Thibaut et al., supra note 28, at 1274-75. As discussed above,
unlike settlement discussions or "[b]argaining in the [s]hadow of the [l]aw," Mnookin
Kornhauser, supra note 28, to avoid litigation, however, the interactive process places
employees in the position of negotiating the implementation of an entitlement.
119 Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 496 (2009) (citing LIND & TYLER, supra note 118).
120 Tyler & Blader, supra note 118, at 351-55 (discussing how an individual's
cooperation with a group is shaped by the level of material resources that person receives
from that group). Previously, Doron Dorfman applied procedural justice theory in an indepth study of the corollary process of the Social Security Administration's disability
determination process for SSI or SSDI benefits, which entrenches the binary categories of
disabled and non-disabled. Doron Dorfman, Re-Claiming Disability: Identity, Procedural
Justice, and the Disability DeterminationProcess,42 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 195, 196-98, 221
(2017). It underscores the state's active, public role in advancing a purposive definition of
disability as an inability to work, when juxtaposed with the vastly privatized system of the
interactive process within workplaces.
121 Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 116, at 54.
122 See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist.,

184 F.3d 296, 318 (3d Cir. 1999) ("An employer who acted in bad faith would be in
essentially the same, if not better, position than one who participated . . . . The less the
employer participated, the easier this would become, and . . . the requirement that
employers participate in the interactive process would be toothless.").
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agency oversight has ebbed for decades. 123 The interactive process
appears to borrow from the only two other mandatory-negotiation
frameworks within labor and employment law: Title VII religious
accommodations 124 and labor law.12s
In 1972, nearly two decades before the passage of the ADA, Title
VII was amended to introduce religious accommodations as a requirement of nondiscrimination, unless the employer could demonstrate

undue hardship. 126 Although Title VII's mandate/defense structure is
similar to the ADA's, the standard for religious accommodations is
stricter because of a 1977 Supreme Court decision interpreting Title
VII's undue hardship defense broadly to be triggered whenever the
27
cost to an employer is more than de minimis.1 And as noted in Part

I, the ADA's sole guardrail for the interactive process, good faith,
finds its closest analogy in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
requirement that employers and unions bargain with each other in
28
good faith toward a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).1 The

NLRA has not been interpreted to require that parties make any sub-

stantive move in negotiations, but simply to require the absence of
bad faith. 12 9 Ostensibly, the EEOC fashioned the accommodations
123 See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-

Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 321-22 (2005) (comparing the model of judicially
enforceable individual rights with the regulatory model of minimum standards enforceable
by agencies as the backdrop to the rise of employer self-regulation since the 1960s).
124 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b) (2020). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which placed
reasonable accommodations duties on federal employers, federal contractors, and
recipients of federal funding, originally did not contain an interactive process. In 1992,
Congress amended the Act to adopt the standards of the ADA. See Rehabilitation Act

Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, sec. 503(b),
506, § 794(d), 106 Stat. 4424, 4428 (1992).

§ 791(g), sec. 505(c), § 793(d), sec.

125 The National Labor Relations Act requires employers to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements with unions or labor organizations in "good faith." See supra notes

86-87 and accompanying text.
126 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
127 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
128 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d).
129 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. In labor law, a party that "goes
through the motions" of bargaining toward a CBA with no intent to reach an agreement,
or undertakes unreasonable stalling tactics, breaches the duty of good faith. E.g., U.S.

Ecology Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 223, 225 (2000) (finding of bad faith in surface bargaining),
enforced, 26 F. App'x 435 (6th Cir. 2001); Health Care Servs. Grp., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 333,
336 (2000) (finding employer that failed to appear for scheduled bargaining sessions,
among other stalling tactics, evinced bad faith). Indeed, the common law of the interactive
process that has developed has come to mirror the functional approach to good faith as
outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "Good faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and

consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types
of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards
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mandate as a hybrid of the two precedents: one grounded in public
law, one in private law.
Access to accommodations was effectively delegated to private
conversations that could have infinite variations in worksites across
the country. As a baseline, a decentralized interactive requirement
makes sense in light of the alternatives. 130 However, a mandate
designed to rely upon private process to eliminate discrimination must
account for "information, structure, decision rights, and incentives" to

be successful in protecting the agency of subordinate groups seeking
meso-level change. 131 Under a procedural justice approach, the fairness of an internal workplace process is generally measured against
the following values: "consistent bias-free application, accurate infor-

mation usage, an appeal mechanism to correct inadequate decisions,

and conformity to broadly prevailing norms and ethics." 132 Judicial
review of parties' meaningful engagement in the process under a
good-faith standard ex post can only go so far.
Prior to the ADA's passage, Congress heard testimony related to
organizational psychology and the benefits of involving multiple
stakeholders in designing accommodations. Mark Donovan, a community employment and training program manager for the Marriott
Corporation, recommended that the statute "establish processes and
frameworks [that] promote cooperation rather than confrontation
between various constituencies in the resolution of challenges."1 3 3 His
testimony drew from his own experience integrating employees with
disabilities into the workforce.1 34 He urged lawmakers to include a
wide array of parties in the interactive process beyond the individual
worker as needed, such as "professional organizations, industry
associations, public sector officials, advocacy groups, service providers
of decency, fairness or reasonableness." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTs.
(AM. L. INST. 1981).

§ 205 cmt. a

130 The alternatives could be, e.g., a system of mandatory disclosure of any/all
disabilities in order to be eligible for an accommodation at any point without regard for the
level of severity of the disability or impairment; or a mandatory central registry that
dictates an accommodation regardless of the specific work environment.
131 Lobel, supra note 119, at 491. Although here Orly Lobel examined the web of
governance approaches in the context of legal design of corporate whistleblowing regimes,

the principles are broadly applicable to default internal workplace processes. Within
organizational theory, employers that fail to eliminate bias in their practices act as "mesolevel social structures that limit the personal agency and collective efficacy of subordinate
... groups while magnifying the agency of the dominant . .. group." Victor Ray, A Theory
of Racialized Organizations, 84 AM. Socio. REv. 26, 36 (2019) (examining the
organizational influence of race and defining the "racialized organization[]").
132 Lobel, supra note 119, at 496.
133 Joint Hearing, supra note 66, at 46-47 (statement of Mark R. Donovan, Manager,
Community Employment and Training Programs, Marriott Corporation).
134 See id. at 45.
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and individuals affected to participate together in seeking solutions.
Inclusion of all parties involved, as active participants in the problem
35
solving process, [would] almost always yield the best answers."1
Doing so, he said, would "lay[] the strongest foundation for imple36
mentation of those answers" as a matter of "conflict resolution."1

The regulations instead conceive of the interactive process as
employer driven and internal. The EEOC directs employers to lead
the dialogue over an accommodation by suggesting they "[a]nalyze"

the employee's job functions, "[c]onsult with the individual with [the]
disability," and "[c]onsider" the employee's preference under the regulation's four-step process.1 37 In a few significant ways, the interactive

process resembles the self-initiated compliance Orly Lobel examined

8
in the context of corporate whistleblowing laws.13 However, those
laws incentivize internal procedural exhaustion and mechanisms for
independent review.1 39 Because the EEOC designed the interactive
process to be informal, the ADA does not require any documentation
40
The
or recordkeeping to memorialize the negotiations themselves.1
interactive process requirement relies on a form of self-regulation,
furthering deregulation with only a background threat of agency
enforcement' 4 ' or litigation.1 42 It may come as little surprise that
many employees with disabilities have not fared well during the quiet
revolution.

135 Id. at 47.
136
137

See id.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2020) ("[I]t may be necessary for the covered entity to

initiate an informal, interactive process .... "); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 423. The EEOC
appendix notes that if more than one accommodation would be effective, "the preference
of the individual with a disability should be given primary consideration," however, the
employer has "ultimate discretion" to choose "the less expensive accommodation or the
accommodation that is easier for it to provide." Id.
138 See Lobel, supra note 119, at 496-98.
139 See id. at 497-98.
140 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) ("[I]t may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an
informal, interactive process . . . ."). But cf Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204,

§ 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)) (requiring audit committees
of public accounting firms to establish procedures for "the receipt, retention, and
treatment of complaints" and "confidential, anonymous submission by employees"). The
problems employees will encounter under procedural justice criteria are evaluated below
in Section II.A.
141 Cf Estlund, supra note 123, at 355-62 (discussing the issue of regulatory
underenforcement in the context of labor law's statutory framework of self-regulation).
142 See Hickox, supra note 12, at 149.
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II
A PROMISE NOT YET FULFILLED
Even after Congress overrode Supreme Court decisions hostile to
the ADA's substantive disability standard through statutory amend-

ment, there is good reason to believe that accommodations law still
does not reach those who may need it most. 143 Section II.A evaluates
the statute's overall design to shed new light on procedural and institutional barriers to accessing the mandate. Although a growing
number of proposals-including the highly anticipated Pregnant
Workers Fairness Act-seek to adopt the ADA's mandate for additional groups of workers, 144 its framework of privatized regulation
continues to reflect the need for broader interventions. Section II.B
weighs these proposals to replicate the mandate against the theoretical and practical concerns regarding their effectiveness.
A.

The Interactive Process as Constraint on the Accommodations
Mandate

Any regulation of the interactive process should make it difficult
for employers to act arbitrarily and without factual basis in denying an
accommodation. However, as detailed below, the empirical data
reveal a framework that fails to address the power differentials
affecting a right that must be negotiated. Employers are particularly
hostile to requests from minority employees and those in physically
demanding positions, 145 despite the ADA's explicit goal of targeting
economic precarity. 146 The highly discretionary structure of the interactive process could have yielded a prediction decades earlier that
remediating ableist workplaces would stall.
It is now anodyne to remark that the ADA has failed to increase
the overall employment rate of people with disabilities, as their
workforce participation may have actually declined. 147 But criticism of

&

143 See infra Section II.A.2.
144 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
145 See infra Section II.A.2.
146 See supra note 44 and accompanying text; cf Denise M. Rousseau, Violet T. Ho
Jerald Greenberg, I-Deals: Idiosyncratic Terms in Employment Relationships, 31 ACAD.

MGrr. REv. 977, 977-78 (2006) (describing increased acceptance of special employment
conditions outside the disability context that are voluntarily negotiated between individual
workers and employers as a means of recruiting and retaining employees with skills valued
by the employer). See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct
as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 921 (2003) (discussing how, at the time of its
enactment, many perceived the ADA to be a form of welfare reform focused on giving

low-income individuals with disabilities jobs rather than public assistance).
147 Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 926-50 (2001)
(finding lower employment rates for certain demographics of workers with disabilities
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the ADA's track record should be contextualized further within two
phases often elided in legal commentary. Employer bias and hesitance
to provide accommodations pose obstacles at the hiring stage; after
hire, they hinder the interactive process once an employee then
reveals a need for an accommodation. In this section, my analysis
emphasizes the latter phase of integration but recognizes the interrelated influence of structural barriers at the hiring stage.
1.

Rates of Non-Accommodation

Until recently, little empirical evidence existed regarding the
rates of non-accommodation among workers with disabilities.1 48 An
innovative, nationally representative study of U.S. workers in 2019
revealed a great deal about the extent to which accommodations are
currently available.1 49 Its findings established that approximately
twenty-three percent of workers either had a workplace accommodation or would require one at work, a figure consistent with current
estimates that one in four Americans will become disabled before
reaching age sixty-seven. 5 0 But a disturbing share of respondents with
a work-limiting "impairment or health problem" (forty-seven to fiftyeight percent) reported that they would benefit from an accommodation but did not have one.1 51 This group includes workers who asked
for an accommodation, as well as those who did not feel empowered
post-ADA); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RES. 693, 701 (2000) (concluding male workers with disabilities
experienced a decline in employment and wages post-ADA); cf. Julie L. Hotchkiss, A
Closer Look at the Employment Impact of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 39 J. Hum.

RES. 887, 888, 909 (2004) (concluding the ADA had no effect on workers with disabilities
in the labor market).
148 Researchers have "[s]urprisingly ...
little information on how many accommodation
requests are made, the percentage that are accepted versus denied, and for those that are
denied, why they are denied." Lisa Schur, Lisa Nishii, Meera Adya, Douglas Kruse,
Susanne M. Bruybre & Peter Blanck, Accommodating Employees with and Without

Disabilities, 53 HUM. RES. MGr. 593, 595 (2014).
149 Maestas et al., supra note 35, at 1004-08, 1011 (nationally representative study of
5,700 respondents).
150 Id. at 1007; id. at 1004 (citing Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 39).
151 Id. at 1007, 1011, 1012 fig.2 (including respondents who were working and those who
were not working, but would benefit from an accommodation that would allow them to
work); see also id. at 1006 (summarizing six studies reflecting only twenty to thirty percent

of individuals with disabilities reported receiving a workplace accommodation when their
health began to limit their ability to work). The study's authors note that a limitation of the
study is its reliance on respondents to accurately assess whether an accommodation "would
in fact help them remain employed or regain employment." Id. at 1023. The study did not
ask respondents why they did not initiate a request for an accommodation. To the extent

that respondents' lack of initiation indicates a fear of stigma, fear of retaliation, or
unawareness of their right to a reasonable accommodation, these outcomes may reflect
worker disempowerment and information deficits.
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to ask.152 Equally troubling, more than one in four respondents who
did request an accommodation from their employer were denied one
entirely. 153
Not only has the ADA failed to secure accommodations for a
wide swath of employees that the statute was intended to cover, but
improper denials of access have become increasingly common. The
share of EEOC charges citing a failure to accommodate has more
than doubled since implementation: from 14.3% of all claims in
charges under the ADA in 1993 to 36.7% of all claims by 2014.154
For their part, employers have expressed concerns about
employing disabled workers or bearing the costs incurred by an
accommodation.1 55 Yet surprisingly, U.S. Census data show that
ninety-five percent of persons making accommodations requests are
people without disabilities.1 56 The subject of these special requests
from employees without disabilities similarly include job flexibility, a
152 Id. at 1012.
153 Id. at 1020 tbl.6. The questionnaire's phrasing of work-limiting impairments or health
problems is not a complete proxy for legal ADA eligibility, but it is the closest available to
lay respondents since prior surveys that omit a work-activity limitation question have led
to biased estimates. Burkhauser, Houtenville & Tennant, supra note 2, at 201, 205. Because
"disabilities" refers to a heterogenous array of conditions with varying levels of severity,
relying upon studies that include disabilities widely rather than selectively will address
some of the skews that may result from the varying levels of social stigma that attach to
different conditions. E.g., Shinall, supra note 12, at 645.
&

154 Von Schrader et al., Creating an Accommodating Workplace, supra note 91, at 113

fig.1. The rise cannot be attributed to the ADAAA's expansion of the definition of
"disability," effective May 2011, as by then failure-to-accommodate claims had already
doubled their share of ADA claims in EEOC charges to around thirty percent. Regulations
to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as
Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,978, 16,980 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630) (noting the effective date of the broader definition of "disability"); von Schrader et
al., Creating an Accommodating Workplace, supra note 91, at 113 & fig.l. They are the

second-most common ADA claim after discriminatory discharge claims. Id. at 100.
155 Reflecting "aversion to risk," approximately 64% of employers reported that not
knowing how much an accommodation would cost is a challenge in hiring people with
disabilities, and a similar share, 62%, believed that the actual cost of an accommodation
was an additional concern. OFF. OF DISABILITY EMP. POL'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., SURVEY
OF EMPLOYER

PERSPECTIVES

TECHNICAL REPORT

ON THE

EMPLOYMENT

13 (2008) [hereinafter U.S.

OF PEOPLE

wITH DISABILITIES:

DEP'T OF LAB., SURVEY OF EMPLOYER

PERSPECTIVES], https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/odep/research/surveyemployerper

spectivesemploymentpeopledisabilities.pdf.
156

Sarah von Schrader, Xu Xu & Suzanne M. Bruyere, Accommodation Requests: Who

Is Asking for What?, 28

REHAB.

RsCH.,

POL'Y

&

EDUC.

329, 337, 338 fig.4 (2014)

[hereinafter von Schrader et al., Accommodation Requests] (developing estimates from the

May 2012 Current Population Survey Disability Supplement, reflecting 11,844,200
individuals without disabilities versus 642,900 individuals with disabilities having made an
accommodations request). The Census questionnaire asks for historical requests of their
current employer rather than limiting the timeframe to the prior year. See id. at 333 tbl.1
(asking respondents if they "ever requested any change in [their] current workplace").
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change in policy, additional equipment, or other forms of assistance
that deviate from their employer's "normal" work structure.157 Instituting a rights-claiming system may not have encouraged more
requests from those for whom the law was intended: A mere 12.7% of
employees with disabilities request accommodations, nearly comparable to the rate at which employees without disabilities request
accommodations (8.6%).158
The interactive process and its good-faith guardrail are not adequate protections for employees whose employers are not familiar
with modifying job duties. This resistance is particularly strong in hierarchically low-ranked positions. 159 Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin
Memorial Hospital provides a cautionary example of the harm of
excessive discretion in the interactive process. 160 In that case, Arnie
Armstrong suffered a back and neck injury before being hired as a
hospital stock clerk. 161 The position required placing supplies on carts,
pushing the carts, and putting the supplies away.16 2 His employer
rated him a satisfactory or better employee throughout his tenure. 163
However, a reinjury prompted him to request accommodations in

which he would not perform heavy lifting, pulling, or bending.164 The
hospital responded that because stock clerks were required to lift
items weighing up to 150 pounds (a claim Mr. Armstrong disputed),
he could not return to his job. 165 During the interactive process, the
parties disagreed about the essential functions of a job Mr. Armstrong
had held for six years, and subsequent interactions revealed that the

process foundered
regulations. 166

at this first step laid out in the EEOC

157 See id. (listing employee special requests under "Accommodation type").
158 Id. at 337.
159 See infra Section II.A.2.
160 438 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006) (analyzing a failure-to-accommodate claim under
state disability discrimination law, which is interpreted under standards identical to the

ADA). Then-Judge Alito joined in the unanimous panel decision reversing the district
court and remanding the case for a retrial. Id. at 242, 246.
161 Id. at 242.
162

Id.

163 Id. at 242-43.
164

Id. at 243.

165 Id. at 242-44.
166

See id. at 243-45, 248; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 423 (2020) (exhorting employers to

"(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and essential
functions"). The EEOC's sole illustration of the interactive process in fact revolves around

a position involving manual labor: a sack handler position in which the employee originally
had to pick up fifty-pound sacks and transport them between rooms, noting that the

employer could analyze the job and "determine[] that the essential function ... is not the
requirement that the job holder physically lift and carry the sacks, but the requirement that
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Mr. Armstrong ultimately returned to his stock clerk position
after obtaining a doctor's note clearing him to work, and remained in
the role for two more years. 167 At that point, due to staff vacancies,
stock clerks like Mr. Armstrong were required to assume linen distri168
These responsibilibution responsibilities in addition to their own.
ties required Mr. Armstrong to repeatedly bend down and pick up
169
twenty- to thirty-pound bundles of linen from a five-foot deep cart.
Mr. Armstrong disputed the new responsibilities, and argued that the
70
position was more strenuous than his stock clerk job.1 However, the
hospital did not accommodate his request to return to his original
duties. 17 1 At this stage in the process, both parties disagreed about the
limitations posed by his disability, the nature of the accommodation
needed, and whether the new position was an effective accommoda73
tion1 72-illustrating a breakdown of the interactive process.1
The new position caused a reinjury within two weeks, requiring
74
Mr. Armstrong to seek emergency treatment.1 He returned to work
with further medical restrictions: He was not to perform excessive
lifting, bending, pushing, or pulling.1 75 After he requested to return to
the stockroom, the hospital ultimately required him to choose
between taking disability leave or resigning.1 76 He chose to take leave,
but the hospital fired him once his condition did not improve, under
177
the theory that he was unable to perform the second job.
Mr. Armstrong and the hospital exchanged copious information
for years, but did not find resolution even after two jury trials and an
appeal to the Third Circuit, which issued a decision seven years after
his last day at work.1 7 8 The panel held that jury interrogatories erred
in suggesting that Mr. Armstrong had to request a specific accommodation, which precluded jurors from inquiring into whether the hosthe job holder cause the sack to move [between rooms]." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 424

(2020).
167

Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 243-44.

168

Id.
Id.

169

171

Id.
Id. at 244-45.

172

Id.

170

173 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 423; supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra notes
198-202 and accompanying text.
174 Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 244.
175

Id.

176 See id. at 244-45.
177 See id. In addition, the panel recounted the alleged harassing remarks Mr.
Armstrong's supervisor made in reference to his disability throughout the interactive
process. Id. at 243.
178 See id. at 243-45.
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pital thwarted the interactive process. 179 If jurors had examined the
process, they might have allowed him to prevail because he "could
have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer's lack of
good faith."18 0 The court reasoned that the hospital made a "unilateral
decision" instead of engaging in open dialogue.181 The panel itself
then speculated whether the linen cart could have been modified;
whether a fellow clerk could have traded some functions for Mr.
Armstrong's linen functions; and whether a kitchen job, that was in
fact available, could have been offered as reasonable
accommodations.1 82
Intersectional factors such as an employee's relatively low rank,
explored in the next Section, point to additional "built-in headwinds"
limiting the reach of the mandate when employers have discretion to
choose the ultimate accommodations or withhold complete information.1 83 In other cases, the wide latitude afforded to employers as the
interactive

process

plays

out remains

commonplace.1 84 How

179 See id. at 247-49.

180 Id. at 246 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 320 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Although courts reviewing an interactive process for bad faith do not reference any
particular doctrine, under the common-law duty of good faith implied in every contract,
including the employment relationship, the hospital appears to have failed to satisfy basic
tenets of common-law good faith in its blatant failure to cooperate with a reasonable
request for accommodation. Cf AYRES & KLASS, supra note 88, at 707 (including among
the circumstances where claims of bad faith frequently arise: "prevention, hindrance, or
failure to cooperate" and "exercise of discretion granted by the contract"); Good Faith,
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining good faith as "[a] state of mind
consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation,
(3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or
business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage").
181 See Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 248-49.
182 Id. at 248.
183 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Such arbitrariness of
employers' discretion during the interactive process is commonplace and persists today.
See infra note 184.
184 See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
defendant's five-month delay and failure to respond to employee's initial request for an
accommodation caused a breakdown in the interactive process, and absent an undue
hardship defense would have been grounds for a failure-to-accommodate claim), vacated
on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002); Budwig v. Allegiant Air, No. 18-cv-01068, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160481, at *2-9, *21-25 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020) (recognizing a failureto-accommodate claim of an air transport supervisor disabled by a new cleaning agent who

was placed on unpaid leave for nearly six months after a temporary demotion to flight
attendant, in part because for two months, the defendant did not explore a simple

proposed accommodation of providing gloves); Luckett v. Dart, No. 14-CV-6089, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 124311, at *45-48 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017) (recognizing the same regarding a
supervisor of a corrections officer with conditions including PTSD where suspicions

regarding conflicting medical examinations were not followed up on with the employee,
but resulted in the employer's improper denial of accommodation based upon "lack of
medical documentation").
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employers "value" employees with subordinate identities appears to
explain they are less likely to be accommodated through the interactive process than their peers.
2.

IntersectionalFactors:Education, Race, Class, and Gender
Awareness

that

organizational

hierarchies

"reflect[]

and

reproduce[] the culture of the larger society" is a tenet of social constructionist theory that the ADA embraced in justifying placing the

mandate on employers. 185 Nevertheless, accommodations law and
commentary are relatively silent as to how social markers such as disability and race are mutually constructed to uphold ableism within systems of marginalization, stereotyping, segregation, and other
resistance to dismantling white supremacy. Operation of the accommodations mandate at the granular level, without more, fails to
advance the ADA's rationales for institutional transformation.

Social identities and organizational hierarchy amplify majoritarian
practices absent system-wide intervention. Empirical comparisons of

outcomes for people with disabilities across demographic dimensions
reveal that firms have denied additional accommodations that should
have been provided. The few multidimensional studies that have

examined success rates in securing accommodations have concluded
that several factors-namely, education below a college degree, racial

and gender minority status, and physically demanding jobs-are correlated to fewer grants of accommodations. 186
While more detailed empirical studies of accommodations denials
correlated to race and disability are needed, current data reflect concerning disparities. Qualitative interviews from a landmark study of
government employees showed that white employees were three

&

185 Sharon L. Harlan & Pamela M. Robert, The Social Construction of Disability in
Organizations: Why Employers Resist Reasonable Accommodations, 25 WORK
OCCUPATIONS 397, 399 (1998) (citing GARETH MORGAN, IMAGES OF ORGANIZATION

(1986)); see Ray, supra note 131, at 26 ("Scholars of organizations typically see
organizations as race-neutral bureaucratic structures. Scholars of race and ethnicity have
largely neglected the role of organizations in the social construction of race."); Ribet, supra

note 21, at 212-13 (discussing ways that disability is compounded to justify ideas of racial
inferiority); Jamelia N. Morgan, Toward a DisCritApproach to American Law, DIsCRIT
EXPANDED: INQUIRIES, REVERBERATIONS & RUPTURES (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript

(discussing how
at 6-11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3730705
racism and ableism are interconnected, noting the need for more research on the subject,
and using Disability Critical Race Theory as a framework to better understand the issue).
186 See, e.g., Matthew J. Hill, Nicole Maestas & Kathleen J. Mullen, Employer
Accommodation and Labor Supply of Disabled Workers, 41 LAB. ECON. 291, 292, 294 tbl.2,

297 (2016) (surveying U.S. respondents who were newly disabled workers and in their
fifties and concluding "the most predictive factors are relatively fixed employee
characteristics such as education and race," and correlation between denials and physically
demanding jobs); infra notes 187-88, 194-96 and accompanying text.
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times as likely as Black employees to have a supervisor affirmatively
suggest an accommodation to them. 187 Whether an employee received
an accommodation was "almost always associated with the position in
the job hierarchy" of the individual making the request under the view
that "[c]lerical, service, and blue-collar workers are easier and cheaper
to replace than to accommodate." 188 Lower-level employees are perceived to be "one-dimensional" and measured by only a few tasks
even if the jobs entail "considerable intellectual, emotional, or other
invisible work." 18 9 Higher-level employees who enjoy more flexibility
at work can informally obtain accommodations, such as taking breaks
or shifting their work schedules-and many are able to avoid the
interactive process entirely.1 90 Two studies in the context of volunta-

rily provided flexible scheduling programs, i.e., benefits with considerable overlap with the needs of people with disabilities, have shown
that white, "professional" workers benefit from the programs while
employers hindered non-white workers with lower pay and lower educational attainment in accessing those opportunities.1 91 In the analogous context of students with disabilities, studies of the distribution of
finite state resources pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) reflect student disparities that break down
along racial and socioeconomic lines. 192 Like the ADA's interactive
187 Harlan & Robert, supra note 185, at 414.
188 Id. at 422.
189 Id. at 423.
190 See id. at 413-14. A nationally representative study of lawyers, who occupy a

specialized position with high socioeconomic status, illustrates this counterpoint. Among
those self-identified as having a disability, almost two-thirds-sixty-five percent-made a
request for an accommodation from their employer. Peter Blanck, Ynesse Abdul-Malak,
Meera Adya, Fitore Hyseni, Mary Killeen & Fatma Altunkol Wise, Diversity and Inclusion
in the American Legal Profession:FirstPhase Findingsfrom a National Study of Lawyers
with Disabilities and Lawyers Who Identify as LGBTQ+, 23 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 23, 46,
47, 73 tbl.3.1 (2020) (further noting that 29.9% of attorneys who reported separately

experiencing bias stated that it was based upon identification with a disability). The highest
proportion of accommodations requests were made by mid-career lawyers-34.8%-as
compared with early-career lawyers-24%-and late-career lawyers-24.3%. Id. at 46, 74

tbl.3.1.
191 Lonnie Golden, The Flexibility Gap: Employee Access to Flexibility in Work

Schedules,
AND THE

in FLEXIBILITY IN WORKPLACES: EFFECTS ON WORKERS, WORK ENVIRONMENT

UNIONS 38, 48-49, 51 (Isik Urla Zeytinoglu ed., 2005); Jennifer E. Swanberg,

Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes & Krista Drescher-Burke, A Question of Justice: Disparities in
Employees' Access to Flexible Scheduling Arrangements, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 866, 879 (2005).
192 See, e.g., Caruso, supra note 32, at 196 (concluding from Massachusetts data that the
IDEA system produces inequitable outcomes for non-white children with disabilities, who
were "largely over-represented in separate classrooms, but significantly under-represented

in [much more expensive] private residential facilities"); Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester,
STUDENTS WITH
LEARNING DISABILrTIES 75-77 (1997) (concluding from California data that the IDEA
system providing accommodations to students with disabilities permitted relatively raceJUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF
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process, IDEA processes for obtaining individualized education programs for children are so discretionary that they "provid[e] no assurance of equal treatment." 193
Women in lower-ranked positions were the most likely to have

disability accommodation requests denied (40%), compared with the
rate of denial for all lower-ranked workers (38%), and for all higherranked jobs (only 22%).194 Female workers may be more likely to be
denied accommodations due to the confluence of disability stigma and
ascribed femininity, which clash with negotiating norms that predominately favor masculine attributes, as in the well documented context
of women negotiating over their salaries. 195 One of the only studies to
examine LGBTQ+ identity and accommodations, a study of lawyers,
found that transgender individuals who self-identify as a racial or
ethnic minority, "LGBQ," and having a disability have the lowest
probability of having their accommodation request granted (14%),
followed by cis-male and cis-female individuals who identify as racial
or ethnic minorities, "LGBQ," and also having a disability, who were
granted accommodations at a rate of 19% for men and 43% for
women. 196
and class-privileged white children to access higher-cost or nonstigmatic educational
resources). Conversations with Daniela Caruso and Ruth Colker were helpful in
developing these connections.
193 Caruso, supra note 32, at 195 (citing Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare
Administration: Rules, Discretion, and EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.

1121, 1126-28 (2000)).
194 Harlan & Robert, supra note 185, at 418 tbl.3 (noting one-third of women's
accommodation requests were rejected, compared to one-quarter of men's requests).
195 Michelle A. Travis, GenderingDisability to Enable Disability Rights Law, 105 CALIF.

L. REV. 837, 875-82, 880 nn.255-61 (2017) (discussing the gender dimension of poorer
negotiations outcomes during the ADA interactive process for women). In a national study
of lawyers with disabilities, the odds of women being granted accommodations declined
with age. Peter Blanck, Fitore Hyseni & Fatma Altunkol Wise, Diversity and Inclusion in
the American Legal Profession: Workplace Accommodations for Lawyers with Disabilities
and Lawyers Who Identify as LGBTQ+, 30 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 537, 553 (2020); cf
id. at 540 (noting general studies that individuals with advocacy skills, personal confidence,
and knowledge of workplace rights and the ADA are more likely to request
accommodations).
196 Blanck et al., supra note 195, at 553, 559 fig.6. In the breastfeeding context, Marcy
Karin and Robin Runge observed that a hybrid standards- and accommodations-based
right enacted in the 2010 Affordable Care Act would serve low-income women well given
the negotiable nature of breaks and locations for pumping, and the unequal bargaining
power between hourly workers and their managers. Marcy Karin & Robin Runge,

Breastfeeding and a New Type of Employment Law, 63

CATH.

U. L. REV. 329, 369 (2014).

Karin and Runge ultimately argue that the Affordable Care Act fails to fully protect lowincome women because the break time for pumping milk is unpaid. Id. As to the
conceptually linked statuses of pregnancy and disability, see infra Section II.B. One study
found a sizable 8-11% gap in employment rates between disabled, pregnant women and
nondisabled, nonpregnant women, and a 4-6% gap between disabled, pregnant women
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These substantial gaps in access counsel caution in relying upon

the ADA accommodations mandate as-is as a model for laws to remediate work structures for additional groups. Disparities in bargaining
power could trigger repercussions for engaging institutional change
advocacy within the individual rights model, particularly for
employees who face marginalization on account of identities that
interact with their disability. Reform efforts must recognize the limits

of the current model and inquire how we may restructure workplaces
to include those who have been historically excluded.
3.

Absence of ProceduralJustice Criteria

The literature on organizational citizenship and workplace governance literature is instructive as to why the accommodations man-

date has not achieved the social progress it intended. Building upon
the procedural justice model pioneered by Tom Tyler and E. Allan
Lind, Lobel articulated four elements of procedural justice for the
workplace: (1) quality of decisionmaking, including "decision-maker
neutrality, the objectivity and factuality of decision making, and the
consistency of rule application"; (2) quality of interpersonal treatment, including "concerns shown for people's dignity and rights";
(3) the "formal rules and structures of the organization, statements of
organizational values, and communication of information about organizational procedures"; and (4) the discretion of informal organizational authorities, such as "the daily interactions between co-workers
19 7
Only one of these eleand between employees and supervisors."
ments is contemplated under the interactive process.
The employer-driven and informal nature of the interactive process affects parties' perceptions of the quality of the decisions that
result. The fact that both parties are procedurally obligated to
exchange information and interact to reach a potential solution does
not render the process neutral. If an employer were not already
inclined to grant the accommodation, it may contest whether the
and nondisabled, pregnant women. Jennifer Bennett Shinall, The Pregnancy Penalty, 103
MTNN. L. REV. 749, 802-03 (2018).
197 Lobel, supra note 119, at 496 (citing Tom R. Tyler & Stephen L. Blader, The Group

Engagement Model: ProceduralJustice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERS.
& Soc. PSYCH. REv. 349 (2003)). The movement for deformalization of the liberal
litigation model took root in the 1980s and was well under way by the ADA's enactment
and the EEOC's creation of the interactive process. See Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn,
Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1387-91,
1398-404 (1985); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Procedure:ADR and the Justices' "Second
Wave" Constrictionof Court Access and Claim Development, 70 SMU L. REv. 765, 771-74

(2017); see also supra note 73; infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (describing the
Third Circuit's incongruent analogizing of the interactive process to "mediation").
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employee qualifies as work-capable, 198 a legal determination that may
overshadow information-sharing about potential solutions otherwise
emphasized in the formal regulations. During the interactive process,
the employer might question whether the employee is in fact able to
work;1 99 whether the employee is disabled; 20 0 whether certain func-

tions of the employee's job are "essential" and not subject to modification; 20 1 or the applicability of any of the undue hardship defense
factors, particularly those relating to operational or financial difficulty
that often depend on information uniquely in the knowledge of the
employer, rather than the employee. 202 During this back and forth,

most workers lack access to organizational precedent or procedural
protections that unions traditionally provide. Currently, nine out of
ten U.S. workers are not unionized and typically do not have access to
an intermediary with institutional knowledge of an employer's operations and practices. 20 3
Under the first factor of a procedural justice analysis, neutrality,
the ADA's interactive process rests upon unwarranted assumptions
that employers will openly share information with sufficient detail to
aid employees in discussing undue hardship factors of operational
impact and affordability; and that they will even adopt a problemsolving approach. 204 Even as the process anticipates some information
asymmetry between the disabled employee and the employer,
somehow an individual employee is expected to embark on the inter198 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 423 (2020) (providing further guidance on the regulations'
recommended four steps in the interactive process, acknowledging that "the employer, in
consultation with the individual requesting the accommodation, should make an
assessment of the specific limitations imposed by the disability on the individual's
performance of the job's essential functions").
199 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual" as an employee who is able
to
perform the essential functions of the job).
200 Macfarlane, supra note 12 (manuscript at 9) (citing Diedre M. Smith, Who Says
You're Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA Definition of Disability, 82
TUL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2007)) (discussing the persistence of the medical model during the
interactive process and within broader society); Areheart, supra note 2, at 183, 192.

201 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(8).

202 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also supra notes 4, 160-83 and accompanying text (giving
an illustrative example of the interactive process between employee and employer).
203 Organized labor has sustained such heavy legal and economic battering that union

density has dropped to a near-historic low of 10.8%. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., UNION
MEMBERS-2020 (2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. Union density
in the United States today is far lower than its post-war height of 36% in 1953. SAMUEL
ESTREICHER & MATTmw T. BODIE, LABOR LAw 41 (2d ed. 2020). As of 2018 the figure
for the private sector, 6.4%, is lower than the level that existed prior to the enactment of
the NLRA. Id.
204 See Lobel, supra note 119, at 496 (describing the problems associated with corporate
reporting systems where management channels receiving complaints are embedded within
the organization).
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active process on equal footing. The mandate also shifts any costs of
the accommodation onto employers, to whom most courts defer as to
205
These dynamics do
operational judgment in employment matters.
the workplace is
unless
not lend themselves to an impartial forum
unionized and has the right to arbitrate a denial of an accommodation
206
as a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement.
The EEOC regulations do appear to incorporate the second
factor-quality of interpersonal treatment-by guiding employers in
two of the outlined steps to "consult" the employee about her or his
20 7
But the third
disability and options for the accommodations.

factor-the existence of formal rules and structures-seems to depend
on the sophistication and scale of the employer, and the regulations
strive against formality by characterizing the interactive process as

"informal" and "flexible." 20 8 Social science and forum studies have
shown that racial minorities and women experience worse outcomes
209
in informal negotiation settings overall.

Finally, the last factor-"discretion of informal organizational
authorities," such as daily interactions between coworkers and super205 Hundreds of court opinions have stated that judges do not sit as "super-personnel
departments," and that even under the ADA, "a statute that directly commands courts to
second-guess the manner in which employers currently structure their enterprises."
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 25, at 25 (quoting Charles A. Sullivan, Circling
Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditionaland Reverse Discrimination in Title

VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1031, 1115-16 & n.337 (2004)).
206 See Hickox, supra note 12, at 157 (describing
antidiscrimination provisions in CBAs).

union efforts to incorporate

207 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 423 (2020).

&

208 Lobel, supra note 119, at 496; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at
423; see also Susanne M. Bruyere, William A. Erickson & Sara A. VanLooy, The Impact of
Business Size on Employer ADA Response, 49 REHAB. COUNS. BULL. 194 (2006)
(describing issues faced by smaller businesses in complying with the ADA).
209 Delgado et al., supra note 197, at 1387-91, 1398-404 (describing the reasons for
disparate experiences and outcomes in informal negotiations for racial minorities and
women). For studies documenting worse outcomes for racial minorities and women in
informal dispute resolution, see Christine Rack, Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic
Minority BargainingPatternsin the Metrocourt Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 211,
222, 248-90 (1999); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants'Ethnicity
and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW
Soc. REv. 767, 776-89 (1996); see also Gilat J. Bachar & Deborah R. Hensler, Does
Alternative Dispute Resolution FacilitatePrejudiceand Bias? We Still Don't Know, 70 SMU
L. REv. 817, 829 (2017) (noting the dearth of studies using statistically significant samples
apart from social science research, but "research on objective outcomes of mediation
suggests that both women and minority males fare worse than white males"). Through his
seminal work on the deformalization movement, Richard Delgado deployed social science
theory to explain why the structural aspects "inherent in informality itself" would
disempower minorities seeking remediation. Richard Delgado, The Unbearable Lightness
of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Critical Thoughts on Fairnessand Formality, 70 SMU L.

REv. 611, 612-13, 618-22 (2017) (synthesizing social science literature and empirical
studies).
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visors 2 1 0-would depend on an organizational culture educated about
disabilities to support a procedurally just outcome. The interactive
process grants employers wide discretion to shape the dialogue as
between supervisors or higher-level trained administrators. Fear of
disability stigma and economic insecurity continue to dissuade
employees from asking their employers to comply with the ADA
under current law. 2 11 The most common reason workers with disabilities provide for not disclosing a disability is the risk of being fired or
not hired, 73%, and a comparable share fear their supervisor would be
unsupportive, 60.1%.212 Because accommodations affect "the design
of work and control of workers" within a company, employers
continue to resist. 2 13

Default incentives for employers to participate in the process
center upon the employer's interests in retaining a valued employee
or in avoiding legal liability. The interactive process could increase the
likelihood of an employer implementing an effective accommodation
and reduce the risk of litigation. 214 Indeed, after the EEOC issued
implementing regulations, the Third Circuit urged employers and
employees to take the interactive process seriously as a form of settlement discussion to avoid litigation. 2 15 It soon elaborated on that view,
making clear that it misapprehends the interactive process "as a less
formal, less costly form of mediation,"216 in spite of the fact that mediation requires the involvement of a neutral mediator. 2 17 However, the
210

Lobel, supra note 119, at 496.

211 Cook, supra note 91, at 42-43.
212 Von Schrader et al., Perspectives on DisabilityDisclosure, supra note 91, at 244; cf
Areheart, supra note 17, at 1963 (noting that procedural justice concerns highly influence
whether individuals file sexual harassment complaints).
213 See Harlan & Robert, supra note 185, at 405; see also Maestas et al., supra note 35, at
1007 (recommending ways for employers to increase employee self-reporting to address
unmet accommodation needs); von Schrader et al., Creating an Accommodating
Workplace, supra note 91, at 112-13, 113 fig.1 (demonstrating that the percentage of ADA
charges regarding reasonable accommodation increased over twenty percent between 1993

to 2014).
214 Employers have an incentive to participate in the full course of an interactive
process, even if litigation ensues, because those that engage in the interactive process "are
better positioned to defend themselves, as good-faith participation constitutes strong
evidence" the employer acted reasonably. Flake, supra note 24, at 112.
215 Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that
an employer who does not engage in the interactive process "runs a serious risk that it will
erroneously overlook an opportunity to accommodate a statutorily disabled employee, and
thereby violate the ADA").

216 Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 316 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999).
217 JULIE MACFARLANE,

JOHN

& JONNETTE WATSON
298 (2d ed. 2003)
(describing impartiality and neutrality as the "critical defining characteristics" of a

HAMILTON,

MANWARING, ELLEN ZWEIBEL

DISPUTE RESOLUTION:

READINGS AND

CASE STUDIES

mediator).
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substantial rates of non-accommodation in spite of these incentives
are troubling.

In view of the default, with the employer as the party capable of
218
a disinterested
maintaining the status quo of non-accommodation,
referee would be instrumental. But the ADA does not make any
available to intervene before an employee pursues legal action or,

more importantly, before the employee is laid off, injured, or worse
during the interactive process. Congress incorporated an administrative exhaustion requirement of Title VII into the ADA without
making further provision for time-sensitive cases. 219 As employers are
aware, the number of employees who believe they have experienced
discrimination compared with those who actually pursue legal action
in the form of an EEOC charge or lawsuit-respectively, 0.85% and
2 20
Organizational
0.22% by one count-remains exceedingly low.
hierarchy and the lack of situationally specific guidance lessen the
odds of the parties reaching a mutually satisfactory result.
B.

Proposals to Adopt the Accommodations Mandate as a Model

Notwithstanding these concerns, the accommodations mandate
has been considered an attractive model for other social groups facing
structural barriers in the workplace. After thirty years of experience
with the ADA, a generation of Americans has become accustomed to

the law's private, individualized approach to claiming disability rights,
and employers have become more familiar with compliance obligations and with the benefits of accommodating employees. Proposals to
extend the mandate would adopt the interactive process for accommo-

dations for (1) pregnancy, (2) religious practice, (3) caregiving, and
(4) all other workers. A possible consequence of enacting these proposals would be a reduction in the stigma workers with disabilities
face when seeking accommodations, as expanding the mandate could
shift organizational culture around such requests. However, unless
there are concurrent efforts to conceive of structural change beyond
individuals, these proposals may not substantially expand access to
accommodations. I address each of these proposals in turn.
218 Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"supra note 3, at 870.

219 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating into ADA Title I sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5,
2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of Title VII's enforcement provisions).
220 Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An EmpiricalAnalysis of
Employment DiscriminationLitigation as a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 663, 664,

704, 706 (noting high levels of "underclaiming" and providing an estimate of 3.4 million
potential race discrimination claimants, of which only 28,912 file an EEOC charge, and of
those only about 7,500, or 25.9%, file a lawsuit).
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First, a proposal to extend the mandate to accommodate conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth is closest to becoming

reality. During the second wave of feminism, civil rights advocates'
early debates around pregnancy discrimination revolved around
whether they should distance their arguments from those made in support of disability rights. 221 In passing the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act (PDA), Congress amended Title VII so that discrimination
because of sex included discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 222
Relying on a parity-based model, the PDA requires that "women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ... be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work
...

."223 Confusion over whether company policies or precedent for

accommodations within an organization would be included in that
analysis came to a head in 2015, when the Supreme Court's interpretation of the PDA in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. conceptually
linked, by implication, the provision of pregnancy accommodations to
accommodations provided to disabled and other workers who sought
the same kind of accommodation. 224 The structural logic of this
holding led antidiscrimination advocacy for pregnant workers to now

converge with disability rights.
Women's rights and civil rights advocates were disappointed that
the Young Court declined to hold that the PDA automatically

requires employers to provide accommodations to pregnant workers
221 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy
DiscriminationAct of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 942 (1985) (discussing pregnancy as neither a
disability nor a dysfunction, but a "normal moment in the human reproductive process");
Maureen E. Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating Male: Biology, Gender, and

Discrimination,80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 875, 898 (2005) (same).
222 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
223 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). By requiring sameness of treatment, the PDA left pregnant
employees vulnerable to judicial arbitrage over which kinds of coworkers would be
sufficiently "similar" comparators so that they may prove disparate treatment. Deborah A.
Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the
Amended Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 46 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 961, 963-64, 964 nn.6-7,

968 (2013) (summarizing mixed precedent as to whether employees who received lightduty assignments following workplace injuries and employees with disabilities who
received ADA accommodations were viable PDA comparators).

224 575 U.S. 206, 229-30 (2015). Young's new approach is cloaked as a procedural
evidentiary rule that would locate-and thereby define-subordination. One way to prove

"significant burden," the Court explained, is through the plaintiff's "evidence that the
employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to
accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers." Id. Because employers subject to
both the PDA and ADA must comply with them concurrently, the evidence will almost
always turn on an employer's past provision of accommodations to disabled or other
coworkers.
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22 5
By heeding
that they would have provided to nonpregnant workers.
be granted
not
should
workers
pregnant
that
the employer's argument

"most-favored-nation status," the Supreme Court made their accommodations contingent upon organizational precedent for accommodating workers who were not pregnant. 226 An employer policy that
imposes a "significant burden" on pregnant workers could be discriminatory if the organizational reasons provided are not sufficiently
227
If not, the Court held, then the
strong to "justify" the burden.

unjustified burden on the pregnant worker gives rise to "an inference
of intentional discrimination." 2 2 8 The logical extension of Young's
holding is that detecting sex-based discrimination could remain largely
contingent upon others' abilities to achieve structural justice first, i.e.,
229
Such a
most likely under the ADA's accommodations framework.
"extremely
be
to
convoluted system for pregnant workers has proven
challenging" to litigate and popular support for an affirmative

approach has grown. 230

/

225 See, e.g., Dina Bakst, Peggy Young's Victory Is Not Enough, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
3 26
2
REP. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/ 015/0 /
peggy-young-supreme-court-victory-is-not-enough-for-pregnant-workers (noting the
"tremendous problem" under the Young framework, as "[n]ot only are pregnant workers
expected to produce enough evidence to prove their employer's intention was

discriminatory, they must do so, in many cases, under challenging circumstances where
employers have no official policies or have obscured them for their own benefit," whereas

workers protected by the ADA "can bypass this arduous journey of proof').
226 Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From
Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEo. L.J. 559,

560-61, 582 (2017) (quoting Young, 575 U.S. at 221) (arguing that Young revised the PDA
to support claims that "blur[] the boundary between disparate impact and disparate
treatment" by broadening the potential groups of comparators). Stephanie Bornstein
persuasively describes the Young framework as one intended to uncover sex-based
stereotypes against pregnant workers through "questioning the process and structures in
the workplace," albeit as a preliminary step. Stephanie Bornstein, The Politics of
Pregnancy Accommodation, 14 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 293, 313 (2020).
227 Young, 575 U.S. at 229. The comparative argument ostensibly operates as a form of
impeachment against claims of operational difficulty. For example, the Young Court

.

suggested that a pregnant employee might argue that UPS's "multiple policies . .
accommodat[ing] nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions" would indicate that "its
reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not
sufficiently strong," and "that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate
pregnant employees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination." Id. at 230.
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, The Interaction of the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct
and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct After Young v. UPS, 50 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1423,

1439 (2017) (predicting that employees of small companies may be less likely to find
comparators who have actually been accommodated pursuant to the ADA, or other

applicable policies for comparable limitations, as evidence of discriminatory denial of
pregnancy accommodation).
230 Joanna Grossman & Gillian Thomas, Making Sure Pregnancy Works:
Accommodation Claims After Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 14 HARv. L. & PoL'Y
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There is now broad bipartisan appetite for transitioning pregnancy accommodations from the parity framework to the ADA's

accommodations framework. The Young decision ramped up support
for the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), 231 a bill that would
require employers to provide reasonable accommodations to

employees who have work limitations stemming from pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions, expressly incorporating the
ADA interactive process by reference. 232 After an impressive bipartisan effort, state-law versions of the PWFA have now passed in thirty
states and five cities. 233 For the first time, in 2020, the federal PWFA
passed in the U.S. House of Representatives, by a vote of 329-73, and
it did so again in May 2021.234 If enacted, pregnant workers will more
explicitly be deputized as private agents for structural change. HowREV. 319, 339-40, 342 (2020) (identifying post-Young decisions in which courts demand "a

high threshold showing of who is 'similar' to a pregnant worker," such as source of
impairment, type of impairment, or common supervisor or work location, particularly at

the pleading stage pre-discovery); infra note 231.
231 See Marianne Levine, States Act on Pregnancy Discrimination,
POLITICO

(Sept. 20,

&

2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-shift/2016/09/states-act-onpregnancy-discrimination-seattle-city-council-passes-scheduling-law-dhs-addressingincomplete-fingerprint-records-216416 (referring to the Young decision as the "principal
catalyst" for broadening support for the PWFA); see also Alisha Haridasani Gupta
Alexandra E. Petri, There's a New Pregnancy Discrimination Bill in the House. This Time
It Might Pass, N.Y. Timms (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/04/us/
pregnancy-discrimination-congress-women.html (explaining that pregnancy discrimination
remained "commonplace" after the Young decision, particularly as the Chamber of
Commerce realized that the opinion failed to provide clear guidance regarding employers'
obligations and became motivated to endorse the PWFA).
232 See The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 1065, 117th Cong.
§ 5(7) (2021).
Under section 5(7) of the bill:
[T]he terms "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" have the
meanings given such terms in section 101 of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111) and shall be construed as such terms are
construed under such Act and as set forth in the regulations required by this
Act, including with regard to the interactive process that will typically be used
to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation.

Id. § 5(7).
233 Our Issues: Pregnant Workers Fairness, A BETTER

BALANCE,

https://

www.abetterbalance.org/our-issues/pregnant-workers-fairness (last visited Sept. 11, 2021).
Conservatives are much more willing to accept accommodation requirements as
nondiscrimination mandates "in contexts that are not explicitly racial," such as disability
and pregnancy accommodation. Reva B. Siegel, Comment, The Constitutionalizationof
Disparate Impact-Court-Centered and Popular Pathways: A Comment on Owen Fiss's
Brennan Lecture, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 2001, 2011 (2018).

234 The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 2694, 116th Cong. (as passed by House
of

Representatives, Sept. 17, 2020); The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 1065, 117th
Cong. § 5(7) (2021); H.R. 1065 - Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, CONGRESS.GOV https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1065/actions?q= %7B"search"%3A %5B"
nadler"%5D%7D&r=5&s=3 (last visited Aug. 22, 2021) (noting vote of 305 yeas and 101
nays under "Actions").
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akin to the ADA conever, the data reflect ongoing power disparities
235
particularly for Black
text in seeking pregnancy accommodations,
women, who may face much higher levels of pregnancy discrimination. 236 Whether greater familiarity with the potential limitations of a

single condition under the PWFA, as opposed to the full array of disabilities under the ADA, will hasten changes in organizational norms
remains to be seen.

A second proposal involves extending the interactive process to
requests for religious accommodations under Title VII. In Interactive

Religious Accommodations, Dallan Flake notes that EEOC guidance
from 1980 merely recommended that employers try to accommodate

the employees at minimal cost to avoid incurring an undue hardship,
237
Religious accomand did not discuss dialogue with the employee.
modations are subject to stringent cost standards-employers have238a
defense for anything that imposes more than a de minimis expense.
the
Only after considerable judicial experience with the ADA did

EEOC encourage mutual information-sharing for employees' requests
235 Before Young, more than a quarter million women each year were denied their
NAT'L P'sHIP
requests related to their health and well-being. CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION,

OF EXPECTING AND
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, LISTENING TO MOTHERS: THE EXPERIENCES

NEw MOTHERS IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (2014), https://docplayer.net/12159547-Listening-toBecause
mothers-the-experiences-of-expecting-and-new-mothers-in-the-workplace.html.
their
asked
never
they
that
reported
also
women
of
percent
thirty-eight to forty-two
figure is
employers for pregnancy accommodations that they needed, the quarter-million
R.
likely a serious underestimate of the barriers pregnant workers face. EUGENE
& ARIEL
DECLERCQ, CAROL SAKALA, MAUREEN P. CORRY, SANDRA APPLEBAUM
MOTHERs SPEAK
CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, LISTENING TO MOTHERS III: NEW
HERRLICH,

OUT 36 tbl.18 (2013), https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/health-care/
2
workers
maternity/listening-to-mothers-iii-new-mothers-speak-out- 013.pdf. Pregnant
PDA. See
after Young continue to face difficulties securing accommodations after the
supra notes 229-30 and accompanying discussion.
236 Recent EEOC filing figures suggest that racism operates within this structural
inequality: Three in ten pregnancy discrimination charges are filed by Black women,
NAT'L P'SHIP
although they comprise only fourteen percent of the working-age population.
TO FACE PREGNANCY
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BY THE NUMBERS: WOMEN CONTINUE
DISCRIMINATION

IN THE WORKPLACE:

AN

ANALYSIS

OF

U.S.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

https://
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION CHARGES (FISCAL YEARS 2011-2015), at 3 (2016),
www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/pregnancydiscrimination/by-the-numbers-women-continue-to-face-pregnancy-discrimination-in-theworkplace.pdf. The report did not subdivide PDA claims by form of discrimination, i.e.,
early
pregnancy status, or denial of pregnancy accommodation. In contrast to the ADA,
mandates
accommodations
PWFAs'
state-level
by
abide
data reflects that employers may
and improve retention of pregnant workers somewhat, perhaps because employers may be
and
more familiar with the accommodations, and the range of requests may be narrower
L.
more time-limited. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Protecting Pregnancy, 106 CORNELL
data).
empirical
the
(highlighting
(2021)
1016
REV. 987, 1003, 1013,
237 Flake, supra note 24, at 83 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2019)).
238 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
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for religious accommodations. 23 9 In a 2008 Compliance Manual, the
agency noted that courts have "endorsed a cooperative informationsharing process" for religious accommodation requests similar to the
ADA interactive process for disability accommodations. 240 It is possible that political appetite for reforms to accommodate religious
practice 24 1 will soon match judicial approval of the interactive process

under the ADA and perhaps legislative approval of the PWFA.
A third proposal would add a provision to the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) that would require employers to engage
in a good-faith interactive process with workers over medical or
caregiving leaves, which are job-protected under the law. 242 As others
have noted, an "ideal worker" norm persists within firms, in which
unavoidable caregiving needs contravene entrenched "full-time facetime" expectations because of requests for changes in hours, shifts,
schedules, attendance policies, overtime requirements, and leave of
absence policies. 243 Under Rachel Arnow-Richman's proposal,
239 See Flake, supra note 24, at 84 (citing U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,

DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL

NO. 915.003,

EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL,

48-49 (2008)).

&

240 Id. Two courts of appeal have approved of the interactive process
for Title VII
religious accommodations claims. See EEOC v. AutoNation USA Corp., 52
F. App'x 327,
329 (9th Cir. 2002) (implicitly endorsing the interactive process); see also Thomas v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000) (explicitly endorsing the
interactive process).
241 In recent years, religious organizations and the Trump Administration
sought to
expand the scope of exemptions in favor of discrimination in contravention of civil rights
law, with a primary focus on shielding employers from civil rights liability or expanding
"conscience"-based objections of religious employees. See 3 EMP. DISCRIMINATION L.
LITIO. LGBTQIA+ Discrimination § 27:20, Westlaw (database updated July 2021)
(discussing religious exemptions and LGBTQIA+ patients). Nonetheless, the EEOC did
try to encourage employers to also accommodate religious practices under Title VII's much
narrower accommodations mandate. On January 15, 2021, the majority-Republican
members of the EEOC approved a revision to its non-binding guidance manual addressing
Title VII religious discrimination. Directives TransmittalNo. 915.063, Section 12: Religious
Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
guidance/section-12-religious-discrimination (last visited Aug. 1, 2021); see Kenneth C.
Broodo, Proposed New Religious Discrimination Guidance: EEOC Seeds Exceptions to
Longstanding 'More than Minimal Cost' Defense, NAT'L L. REv. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/proposed-new-religious-discrimination-guidance-eeocseeds-exceptions-to-longstanding (applauding EEOC changes to Title VII guidance, which
included illustrating "exceptions" to the de minimis standard for establishing undue
burden, such as changes to scheduling, tasks, location, and voluntary shift swaps).
242 Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 24,
at 56. The FMLA
is a firm entitlement to unpaid, job-protected leave for one's own serious health condition
or leave to provide care for newborns, new adoptees, or family members with serious
health conditions. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
243 See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization:Individuals with
Disabilities
and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1101 n.1, 1103-15
(2014) (quoting Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
DiscriminationLaw, supra note 15, at 6) (outlining this norm and providing examples of its
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their
employers would be required to negotiate with employees over
leave schedule or job duties when the need for leave arises, or face a
244
Her proposal would also use the employer's lack
monetary penalty.
of good-faith participation in the interactive process as the justifica-

tion for a shift in burden of proof in cases where the plaintiff alleges
2 45
failure to accommodate or retaliation.

By refining the carrots and sticks of the interactive process, the
that
proposal aims to achieve "incentivized organizational justice"

and
would rely on the interactive process to enhance standard-setting
246

This
compliance behaviors: a form of "private due process."
approach would position employers as necessary partners in undoing
247
the second-generation discrimination that inures in workplaces
under a view that regulation cannot generate additional forms of
248
It would introduce a monetary penalty
intervention from the state.
for employers who fail to participate in the interactive process and

add a litigation penalty by shifting the burden of proof onto employers
24 9

But it
as to resulting claims (rather than a substantive-law penalty).
an
upon
based
is purposefully limited to the existing ADA framework
assessment of politically viable options and concern for maximizing
25 0
judicial consistency in any proposal for reform.
A final proposal for reform, the most ambitious, would be a universal accommodations system similar to the ADA's that would be
available to anyone regardless of social status, so long as the
in
employees are work-capable and the accommodation is effective
25 1
Proposed by a group of four scholars,
elevating functionality.
Silvers, Bradley Areheart, and Leslie
Anita
Stein,
Michael Ashley
Pickering Francis, a universal regime would avoid employers and
coworkers resenting-and thus stigmatizing-the provision of accomRedux: The
manifestation); see also, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Caregiver Conundrum
(providing
(2014)
981-86
963,
REV.
L.
U.
DENV.
91
Entrenchment of Structural Norms,
the Transformative
Recapturing
Travis,
norms);
these
of
embrace
judicial
of
examples
Potential of Employment DiscriminationLaw, supra note 15, at 10-12 (further outlining

the ideal worker norm).

56, 58
244 See Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 24, at

requiring blatant
(proposing incentive for employers to comply with procedural right by
for the
violations to accrue liquidated damages equivalent to twice the employee's pay
period).
leave
twelve-week FMLA
245 Id.
246 Id. at 27, 67.
247

Id. at 64.

See Estlund, supra note 123, at 321-22 (articulating this view).
249 Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process, supra note 24, 58-59.
250 Id. at 58.
251 Stein et al., supra note 1, at 737-44.
248
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modations as "special treatment." 25 2 A universal mandate is attractive
in that it could vastly expand the transformation of exclusionary structures and avoid factually intensive negotiation over the degree of
disability-related limitations on work.25 3
A negotiated mandate with the cost-conscious undue hardship
analysis remains intact under this proposal. There is some appeal to
advancing a parity-based norm of accommodations so that no social
group has an exclusive claim to the mandate. But formally extending a
process to all other employees-who have already been doing the
lion's share of the asking 254-does not on its own remove the subordinating factors tied to ignorant or hostile denials of accommodations. 25 5 Broadly expanding entitlement without further addressing
the confluence of factors that maintain social hierarchy within workplaces disregards our knowledge of who is privileged to ask and
receive. Recall that only five percent of accommodations requests
originate from workers with disabilities, and those likeliest to receive
accommodations are white, highly placed, highly paid, or male. 256
Disability law, and antidiscrimination laws generally, require
society to acknowledge subordination-conscious measures as a means
of social history. 2 57 In many respects, movements for racial and gender
equality may look to disability law's methodology, which illuminates
possibilities for antidiscriminatory restructuring of institutions more
generally. 25 8 In a lesser-known chapter of employment law, serv252 Id. at 749-55; see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating
Everyone, 47
SETON

HALL

L. REv. 85 (2016) (proposing to ameliorate "special treatment stigma"

accompanying accommodations by providing reasonable accommodation to everyone
under a universal accommodations mandate, unless it poses an undue hardship); Emens,
Integrating Accommodation, supra note 59, at 861-66 (discussing how accommodations
could create a range of benefits to third parties, such as promoting ergonomics that help
prevent injuries for all, and lower employers' workers' compensation costs, as well as costs,

depending upon design of the accommodations).

253 Stein et al., supra note 1, at 750-52.
254 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
255 The proposal to entitle all work-capable individuals to any accommodation
that is
effective does not alter the current system, as an accommodation is considered reasonable
under the ADA as long as it is "effective." See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
256 See discussion supra Section II.A.2; supra note 156.
257 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability,"
86 VA. L. REv.
397, 401, 456-57, 476-84 (2000) (urging the prioritization of the ADA's antisubordination
purpose over extending a benefit to everyone); RuTH O'BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT:
GENDER, DISABILITY, AND A WORKPLACE ETHIC OF

CARE

6 (2005) (describing

disability

as an ideology in the sense of a frame by which people "interpret and make events
meaningful").
258 See supra notes 185-213; infra notes 313-17, 359, 361 and accompanying
text;
Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293, 328 (2018) (proposing
disability law as an analytical lens for race discrimination and structural inequality, and
noting that "[d]isability law recognizes that many conditions understood as disabling ...
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swiftly benefited from the ADA's accommodations

model when, in 1991, Congress adopted and significantly expanded it
to require employers to make "reasonable efforts" to reemploy them
to an "escalator position," i.e., to help them requalify for their preservice job or to perform the duties of the most proximate job they
25 9
would have occupied if they had not served in the military.
Reflecting the policy priorities afforded to combatting anti-military
bias, such employers must undertake this "accommodation plus"
2
approach regardless of whether the servicemember has a disability. 60
The origins of our current antidiscrimination mandates communicate our understanding of power differentials that would frustrate
26
material outcomes under a universal mandate. 1 As a result,
subordination-conscious frames for accommodations and publicizing
accessibility and innovation for all employees remain necessary.

III
NEW APPROACHES TO REMEDIATING STRUCTURAL
BARRIERS

If we are to facilitate a universal accommodations mindset, new

approaches are needed. Cass Sunstein specifically faulted disability

law's regulatory design as an example of either legislative "failure of
diagnosis" or failure of "coordination," resulting in a lack of accounta262
Proposals that simply replicate the ADA
bility and responsiveness.
accede to Congress's choice to minimize federal agency intervention

and place the onus of social change primarily upon each individual
263 Courts, in turn, continue to defer to
who needs an accommodation.
create disadvantage when combined with an inhospitable social or physical environment");

Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex

Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415, 422-41 (2011) (observing that anti-stereotyping
of
mandates that justified the PDA and the FMLA have partially shifted the costs
note 23, at 769-70
reproduction from individual women to the larger society); Lin, supra
against
discrimination
to
approach
(proposing multiaxial analysis, a contextually variable
dynamics).
institutional
or
structural,
relational,
for
account
that
traits
social
259 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C.
§ 4313(a)(3)-(4); Marcy L. Karin, "Other than Honorable" Discrimination, 67 CASE W.

RSRV. L. REv. 135, 149-51 (2016).
260 Karin, supra note 259, at 153.
261 See supra Section I.B.1.
262 CAsS

R.

SUNSTEIN,

AFTER

THE

RIGHTS

REVOLUTION:

RECONCEIVING

THE

ADA
REGULATORY STATE 93, 105 (1990). Sunstein was aware then that the passage of the
was imminent, but his observation that "no single institution is responsible for introducing
coherence" and that some policies "work at cross-purposes" remains true. Id. at 93.
263 See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV.

for
434, 436-37 (2007), (noting the weak results of the private attorney general model

structural
disability rights and arguing for more robust executive enforcement, such as
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businesses' discretion to structure their workplaces. 2 64 Such proposals

also weaken alternatives such as disparate impact theory, despite the
fact that such approaches can address barriers preventatively and
more powerfully at the structural level. 26 5
The original ADA bet on private process and the liberal individual rights model to advance broad structural change. 266 If the
accommodations mandate represents a form of privatized public law

but its design prevents it from functioning as intended, how, then,
should we proceed? In this Part, I begin to develop new approaches
commensurate with the need for targeted civil rights policy that
respond to the legal developments and concerns raised in Parts I and
II. These include reforms designed to advance structural analysis,
antidiscriminatory norms, and regulation at scale, including publicizing information gathering and access to detailed data regarding
precedent for accommodations by position and industry, enhancing
collective legal approaches to dismantling ableist structures, and
expanding the social insurance model.
A.

Addressing Information Disparities

Contemporary political discourse has revived demands for intelligent governance based upon empirical expertise, 2 67 particularly one
litigation, i.e., "a sustained pattern of cases against large power structures invoking the
power of the courts to oversee detailed injunctive relief').
264 See Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 25, at 23, 25-26 (stating judges
"balk
. .. at inserting themselves deeply into how employers structure their workplaces or
regulate day-to-day interactions among workers").
265 See Michael Selmi, Was the DisparateImpact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701, 755, 780 (2006) (concluding that disparate impact theory has limited success outside of
challenges to written tests and is a difficult theory under which to succeed because it
cannot replace the consensus created by social movements).
266 See Arnow-Richman, Public Law and PrivateProcess, supra note 24,
at 50-51, 55-56
(applying the term "private process" to the ADA accommodations framework and
advocating an extrapolated "private due process" approach to organizational justice).
Some scholars have observed that private enforcement regimes like U.S. civil rights laws
"produce fragmented and incoherent policy" due to the decentralized structure of the
judiciary and the uneven issues presented in a party-driven litigation system. Stephen B.
Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEwis & CLARK L.
REv. 637, 667-68 (2013). This phenomenon is foregrounded in the ADA's undue hardship
defense and regulatory interactive process.
267 See, e.g., Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 ARiz. L. REv.
575, 576, 606-08
(2009) (describing the role of public trust in legitimizing the regulatory state, and
characterizing the regulatory state as grounded in expertise, stewardship, and transparency:
"[T]he public must be satisfied, not only with a decisionmaker's technical qualifications,
but also with the regulatory [system's] motivations, and its ability to construct an
administrative system that will function as intended"). For example, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has drawn heavy criticism during the COVID19 pandemic for failing to take concrete steps to protect workers from a fatal pathogen,

despite a deluge of credible complaints. It did not issue a COVID-19 safety rule until June
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that recognizes worker well-being as crucial to a healthy democracy
268
Congress conceived of disability
and a strong, sustainable economy.

2 69 but did not
accommodations as a form of social responsibility,
require the federal government to address the information deficit
270

employers and employees encounter in the interactive process.
Today, many employers report that they have evaluated decisions
regarding accommodations based upon considerations extending
beyond the cost-benefit frame that animated much of the 1990 ADA
and its early regulations, such as improved coworker interactions,
increases in overall company morale, company productivity, safety,

attendance, interactions with customers, and a broader customer
base. 271
Since most decisions by employers are private, including the millions of decisions made under the ADA, the statute does not require
the state to take responsibility for remediating large-scale, industrial
272
If employers, industrial sectors, and the
discriminatory conduct.
Is OSHA
10, 2021-one which applied only to the health care sector. See Opinion, Why
6 2

A WOL?, N.Y.

TIMES

(June 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/0 / 1/opinion/

coronavirus-osha-work-safety.html (criticizing OSHA's issuance of only voluntary, general

guidelines for worker safety during the pandemic and only a single citation amid 5,000

complaints related to COVID-19); Bruce Rolfsen, OSHA Limits Long-Awaited Virus
L. (June 10, 2021), https://
Safety Rule to Health Care, BLOOMBERG
www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/true/XBSUMHHS000000
(noting public pressure on OSHA since the earliest days of the pandemic to enact a
standard to safeguard workers).
268 See Lindsay F. Wiley & Samuel R. Bagenstos, The PersonalResponsibility Pandemic:
Centering Solidarity in Public Health and Employment Law, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1235,
1235-37 (2020) (situating workplace health and welfare as an intrinsic determinant of
public health). See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69

WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 213, 222 (2012) (describing the ecological model, which

"emphasizes structural explanations for health behaviors and outcomes," as the currently
dominant model of public health science and practice).
269 See supra Section I.B.
270 Employers also face difficulties identifying or assigning values to variables outside of
monetary costs such as effect on employee loyalty and workplace morale, creating
informational deficits that may impede rational choice. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting
Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing
Work/Life Balance, 42 ConN. L. REV. 1081, 1097 (2010); see also Susan Sturm, Designing
the Architecture for Integrating Accommodation: An Institutionalist Commentary, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 11, 13 (2008) (arguing that employers need to know what
questions to ask during an interactive process and proposing that employers seek to reduce
bias and advance inclusion by looking at processes and routines that allow workers to
thrive).
271 Benefits and Costs of Accommodation: Introduction, JOB ACCOMMODATION
NETWORK, https://askjan.org/topics/costs.cfm (last updated Oct. 21, 2020).
272 See supra Part II; SUNSTEIN, supra note 262, at 54-55 (positing that a wide range of
private conduct imposes external costs not adequately accounted for in the private market,
and a "workable theory of externalities" may require political theory "rather than science
or even economics").
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state were already well-versed in more macroscopic approaches to

restructuring and legal coordination, Americans could benefit from
orderly, humane, and racially equitable approaches to collective
accommodations for disabilities. 2 73
To facilitate the flow of information about how society can remediate structural discrimination in the workplace (and how others have
already done so), the state should engage in broad-scale collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information about workers with disabilities. Thus far, the government has stopped short of undertaking comprehensive analysis of structural discrimination in employment,
forcing other actors to assume that responsibility. While politics surrounding increases in regulatory oversight are polarized, legislators
should embrace an information-based route by funding the collection
of detailed information about accommodations others have successfully achieved. 2 74
Unlike Title VII's active solicitation of demographic race and

gender data, the ADA prohibits employers from making a disability273 The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the chaotic, ad hoc, and uneven
nature of accommodations, in response to environmental hazards that not only imperiled
every member of society, but rendered them temporarily disabled within the meaning of
the social model of disability. See Samantha Artiga, Rachel Garfield & Kendal Orgera,
Communities of Color at Higher Risk for Health and Economic Challenges Due to COVID19, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issuebrief/communities-of-color-at-higher-risk-for-health-and-economic-challenges-due-tocovid-19 ("Overall, nonelderly Black, Hispanic, and [American Indian and Alaskan
Native] adults are more likely than Whites are to report fair or poor health."); see also

Alex Ellerbeck, Looming Fight: Millions of Disabled Workers Could Ask for COVID-19
Protections Under ADA, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Aug. 28, 2020), https://
publicintegrity.org/health/coronavirus-and-inequality/disabled-workers-covid-protectionsada (observing how "[alt least 27 million workers under the age of 65 suffer from medical
conditions-including heart disease, diabetes and chronic kidney disease-that put them at
increased risk of dying from COVID-19 . . . [and such] conditions tend to be more
prevalent among people of color"). Advocacy by unionized employees underscored the
strength of disability law as a source of positive rights and potential for collective
accommodations, as well as the systemic inequities that generate common grounds for
future advocacy. See, e.g., infra notes 299-300, 320-21; Ethan DeWitt, As N.H. Schools
Prepareto Reopen, Unions Fight for Teacher Protections, CONCORD MONITOR (July 18,
2020), https://www.concordmonitor.com/As-New-Hampshire-schools-prepare-reopening-

unions-fight-for-teacher-protections-35254450

(discussing de facto sectoral negotiations

over disability accommodations during the COVID-19 pandemic between the National
Education Association, United Federation of Teachers, and all school districts within the
state).
274 Private litigation has steadily displaced resources made available to regulatory
agencies, making such an information-based route more challenging to initiate. Between
President Nixon assuming office in 1969 and the end of the twentieth century, private
federal statutory lawsuits increased 800%. Burbank et al., supra note 266, at 682.

Regulatory theorists attribute this trend to a Congressional preference for private
enforcement mechanisms whenever an executive of the opposing party occupies the White
House to insulate operation of the statute from executive discretion. Id.
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related inquiry prior to or during employment to avoid the possibility

275
To circumvent this
that bias will attach to a positive answer.

problem, the government, rather than the employer, could supplement the U.S. Census process to collect responses about current and
276
past experiences with accommodations anonymously.
Data collection advances agency objectives by providing the basis
for monitoring and enabling the government to strategically allocate
resources where they are needed most. 2 7 7 For example, the EEOC has
required disclosure of race and gender data for employees of large
employers and federal contractors since 1966,278 but only recently has
it begun to explore its potential for strengthening civil rights compliance. In December 2020, the agency unveiled a semi-public database
making available demographic data collected from the mandatory
EEO-1 forms by job category and geographic location, but not by
employer. 279 Drawing from 2008 EEO-1 data, the information from
73,000 businesses encompasses 56 million workers-approximately a
0
third of the U.S. civilian workforce.28 Although the government's
policy outcomes from this macroscopic approach still remain inchoate,
an information-rich approach would bear on an influential theory of
compliance: Regulators are likeliest to secure compliance when they
act as "benign big guns," that is, they can apply moral suasion more
275 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A), (4)(A); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
EEOC-CVG-2000-4, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND
MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE ADA (2000), https://www.eeoc.gov/

laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-disability-related-inquiries-and-medicalexaminations-employees (explaining "what is a 'disability-related inquiry"').
276 By not maintaining the identity of respondents, the federal government as a
potential employer of any respondents also would not violate the ADA's confidentiality
provisions.
277 In arguing for a "minimal sufficiency principle" for agency regulation, Ian Ayres and
John Braithwaite have quipped: "Punishment is expensive; persuasion is cheap." IAN
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 19 (1992).
AYRES

REGULATION:

TRANSCENDING

THE

278 See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2020) (requiring employers under Title VII jurisdiction with
100 or more employees to collect and file EEO-1 demographic data about employees,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c)); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (2020) (requiring EEO-1 forms
from all private federal contractors with 50 or more employees that receive federal
contracts exceeding $50,000); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EMPLOYER
INFORMATION REPORT EEO-1, https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/migrated-files/

employers/eeolsurvey/eeol-2-2.pdf (listing race, ethnicity, and sex as among the required
EEO-1 demographic categories employers must collect and file).

279 Vin Gurrieri, New EEOC Web Tool Aims to Sharpen Diversity Data Access, LAw360

(Dec. 2, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1333696/new-eeoc-web-toolaims-to-sharpen-diversity-data-access (noting searchable online data excludes employer
identities and employees' pay rates).
280 Id.; Table A-1. Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Sex and Age, U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STATs. (July 2, 2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t0l.htm
(entry for civilian labor force for June 2021).
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effectively when they have "bigger and ... more various . . . sticks" to
sanction noncompliance with discrimination law. 281
The government could also administer the survey so as to provide
itself and the public with valuable accommodations information. It
currently surveys the general population through the U.S. Census on
specific reasonable accommodations needed and provided, but it
should further inquire into respondents' specific disabilities (if any), 28 2
job title, employer, location, and sectoral industry. 2 83 Evaluating the
effectiveness of even the current mandate requires access to reliable,
in-depth information managed by the state, an institution that is not
oriented toward profit, but large enough to aggregate and publicize
Census-level data beyond the 60,000 households currently sampled.2 84
281 AYRES & BRArrHWAITE, supra note 277, at 19. On the EEOC's interest in revisiting

its look-askance approach to federal contractors adopting an affirmative action plan
despite having the technology to require regulated companies to submit them for
inspection, see Paige Smith, Prospect of Affirmative Action Checks Worries U.S.
Contractors, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 8, 2021, 5:46 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/

daily-labor-report/prospect-of-affirmative-action-checks-worries-u-s-contractors
(describing enforcement blind spots and the agency's renewed interest in collecting plans
for the first time).
282 Posing the questions to all respondents continues current Census practices, as data
reflect that ninety-five percent of individuals had requested an accommodation at work did
not have a disability. Von Schrader et al., Accommodation Requests, supra note 156, at 337,

338 fig.4. If widely publicized, this fact would vitiate the assumption that coworkers will
resent the provision of accommodations to people with disabilities as receiving special
treatment or as undeserving. See Dorfman, supra note 10, at 596, 609, 616 (reporting

empirical findings that a cognitive bias toward "deservingness" as to whether one should
receive a disability accommodation is grounded in considerations of ethics and fairness).
At the outset of this data-gathering initiative, a goal may be to secure nationally
representative samples.

283 The Current Population Survey (CPS), sponsored through the U.S. Department of
Labor's Office of Disability Employment Policy, asks members of the civilian
noninstitutionalized population broad questions about the nature of any disabilities,
whether any accommodations were requested, the type of accommodations requested, and
whether the accommodation was granted. Von Schrader et al., Accommodation Requests,

supra note 156, at 332, 333 tbl.1. Experts have urged that national surveys be expanded to
include "highly informative" questions regarding respondents' demographic data,
occupation, and-presently limited-industry characteristics. Id.; see also, e.g., Deborah B.
Balser, Predictors of Workplace Accommodations for Employees with Mobility-Related

Disabilities,39 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 656, 657 (2007) (noting shortcomings in large, public data
sets, including the lack of comprehensive models of the intersection between
socioeconomic characteristics and workplace and job characteristics). The American Time
Use Survey, a subset of CPS, intermittently includes questions on access to paid and
unpaid leave. American Time Use Survey (ATUS) Leave Module Microdata Files, U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/tus/lvdataflles.htm. And in
2020, the CPS surveyed the availability of remote work. Measuring the Effects of the
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic Using the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU
OF LAB. STATS. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/covidl9/measuring-the-effects-of-the-

coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-using-the-current-population-survey.htm.
284 Methodology, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/
technical-documentation/methodology.html (last visited June 30, 2021). The U.S. Census
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Because policy, enforcement, and data-gathering expertise related to
disability rights are housed across several agencies, including the
EEOC, DOJ, DOL, and U.S. Census Bureau (within the Department

of Commerce), it may be necessary to institute a process to coordinate
these functions.
To guarantee anonymity and workers' ability to access the results,
the government may administer the survey in multiple languages with
an online option, as it does with the Census. Respondents' privacy can
be preserved when the data is made available to the public, such that
it is de-identified, i.e., only done in a manner that does not reveal any
individual employee's identity and personal information. Directly surveying workers would avoid the proverbial ostrich with its head in the
sand. As discussed earlier, employers continue to fight tooth and nail
to avoid disclosing pay equity data in conjunction with the race and
gender statistics the EEOC has required them to disclose annually for

decades. 28 5
Centralizing access to the information needed by parties to the
interactive process would improve the procedural fairness of the dialogue, particularly as the quality of decisionmaking relies upon objec286
Individual
tivity, factuality of decisionmaking, and consistency.
rebut
could
that
knowledge
institutional
the
employees do not possess
Moreprocess.
employers' hardship arguments during the interactive
over, since all accommodations are time sensitive, expecting
employees to receive information on prior accommodations through
discovery undermines the goals of the ADA. Moreover, while not
every past accommodation may be suitable for a future need elsewhere, employers may not know what accommodations have been
287
effective within the position or industry.

has asked questions about disability status since 1830. Currently the survey results assist
federal, state, local, and tribal governments with planning and funding programs. American

Community Survey: Why We Ask Questions About Disability, U.S.

CENSUS

https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/why-we-ask-each-question/disability

BUREAU,

(last visited

Aug. 8, 2021).
285 See Paige Smith, Rebecca Greenfield & Jeff Green, Gender Pay Reporting May Start
in Weeks Across Corporate America, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 6, 2019, 6:26 AM), https://
www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/bloomberg-law-news/

X64UOPE8000000 (reporting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce "strongly opposed" the
additional demographic disclosures, and urged the Trump Administration to rescind the
new rule); Stephanie Bornstein, Disclosing Discrimination,101 B.U. L. Rev. 287, 300-13,
323-38 (2021) (summarizing political oscillation between EEOC approaches to expand,

then reject EEO-1 data-gathering from employers under Presidents Obama and Trump,
and advocating for imposing affirmative public disclosure requirements that track the pay,
promotion, and harassment of employees by their sex and race).
286 Lobel, supra note 119, at 496.
287 Although there are no statistics regarding the extent to which the public is aware of
prior accommodations beyond word of mouth, only four in ten large employers (i.e.,
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Since 2002, however, the Supreme Court has all but required par-

ties to assess "reasonableness" of an accommodation through precedent. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Court held that plaintiffs
could establish that an accommodation "seems reasonable on its face,
i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases" by demonstrating that "'at least
on the face of things,' the accommodation will be feasible for the
employer." 288 For example, if a UPS driver with a lifting restriction
could point to other UPS drivers that had been granted light-duty
accommodations similar to the one requested-or to similar accommodations made by a comparable organization such as FedEx-and
could access this information during the interactive process, the organizational precedent could provide examples of reasonable resolutions. The availability of accommodation information could thereby
facilitate problem-solving conversations and prevent years of litigation. The Barnett Court stopped short of overreach, given that a prior
accommodation by the employer in a form identical or similar to one
an employee is currently requesting is not required under the ADA at
all. But precedent regarding prior accommodations which deviate
from typical operations may contain the operational detail parties
need to address hardship arguments regarding feasibility, cost, and
effectiveness. 289
By publicizing knowledge regarding accommodations precedent
in a highly visible and comprehensive manner, the government can
help relieve individual workers and employers of the burdens of
devising their own proposals from scratch. 290 Currently, the population of noninstitutionalized civilians in the United States with a disaemploying 250 or more employees) reported collecting information on accommodations
for employees with disabilities to assist with future accommodations in similar situations.
U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES, supra note 155, at 21.
288 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002) (quoting Reed
v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254,

259 (1st Cir. 2001)).

289 The evidentiary pull of organizational precedent was on full display in Young once
the Court announced that discrimination could be shown where disabled workers and
others similarly situated were accommodated, but pregnant workers seeking
accommodations were not. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
290 In addition to the private, ephemeral nature of the interactive process, the meteoric
rise in compulsory private arbitration in the workplace further constricts public records of
ADA failure-to-accommodate actions and the generation of public norms relating to this
right-despite Congress's intent that people with disabilities would not be precluded from
seeking public enforcement and relief. Private adjudications "produce no rules or
precedents binding on nonparties" that "have obvious importance for guiding future
behavior and imposing order and certainty on a transactional world that would otherwise
be in flux and chaos." David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83
GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622 (1995) (citing Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justicein Settlements, 4
Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102, 114-19 (1986)); id. at 2622-23.
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1
bility is at least 40 million. 29 While it is expected to expand, the

employment rate of people with disabilities remains less than half that
2
of people without disabilities. 92 Nonprofits and vocational agencies
293 The Job
provide a vital but inherently limited stopgap.
Accommodation Network (JAN) currently serves as a national onestop resource on effective accommodations for all major disabilities,294 but as a project of the U.S. Department of Labor remains

undersupported as a $13 million nonprofit employing only thirty individuals. 295 When JAN is consulted-approximately 55,000 times a
year 296-it is usually by sophisticated employers and legal counsel
297
rather than employees.

Beyond empowering people engaging in the interactive process,
annual national surveys would also be a powerful tool for the govern291 Disability Characteristics,2019: ACS 1-Year Estimates Subject Tables, U.S. CENSUS
83
1BASIC01
BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?tid=ASMAREA2017.AM1
query"; draw
"search
the
in
"disability"
(select "filter" from the box on the left; then type
your attention to the "Estimate" under "With a disability" to see "41,089,958 with a
'Margin of Error' of ±115,466) (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (estimating 41,089,958
noninstitutionalized civilians with a disability).
292 In 2019, only 30.9% of people with disabilities aged 16-64 were employed in the
United States, compared to 74.6% of people without disabilities aged 16-64. U.S. DEP'T OF
LAB., U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., USDL-21-0316, PERSONS WITH A DISABILITY: LABOR
20 2
0, at 4 (2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
FORCE CHARACTERISTICSdisabl.pdf.
293 Schur et al., supra note 148 at 615; see also Joint Hearing, supra note 66, at 46-47
(statement of Mark R. Donovan, Manager, Community Employment and Training

Programs, Marriott Corporation) (testifying that community-based groups, labor
organizations, and industry, inter alia, should be essential partners with employers in a
collective, deliberative version of the interactive process).
294 See A to Z of Disabilitiesand Accommodations, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK,
https://askjan.org/a-to-z.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). For example, for Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder, JAN provides a list of potential reasonable accommodations and
strategies based upon the particular work limitation. Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (AD/HD), https://askjan.org/disabilities/Attention-Deficit-HyperactivityDisorder-AD-HD.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2021).

295 Office of Disability Employment Policy, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, https://
askjan.org/topics/odep.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (stating the Job Accommodation

-

Network is a "service provided by ODEP"); WVU's Job Accommodation Network
Receives $12.7 Million Funding Renewal, WVUTODAY (Oct. 17, 2017), https://
7
wvutoday.wvu.edu/stories/2017/10/17/wvu-s-job-accommodation-network-receives-12Virginia
West
the
at
located
operations
JAN's
million-funding-renewal (reflecting
University College of Education and Human Services).
296 WV U's Job Accommodation Network Receives $12.7 Million Funding Renewal, supra
note 295.
297 The Job Accommodation Network's funding agency declined to approve the release
of a breakdown of stakeholder usage figures. E-mails from Anne Hirsch, Assoc. Dir., Job
Accommodation Network, to author (Aug. 31, 2021, 16:24 EST; Sept. 7, 2021, 16:18 EST;
Oct. 4, 2021, 15:48 EST) (on file with author). However, based upon the author's
experience of more than a decade of practice and research, it is far more common for wellresourced employers and legal counsel to access JAN than individuals with disabilities.
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ment. For example, this data could be used to assess and track organizational culture over time. 298 This information could help the
government identify discriminatory norms and legislate against them.

This measure draws inspiration from an emerging trend in which
unions have won contract terms requiring employers to administer
regular climate surveys, or equity surveys, and to share survey results
with the union and joint employer-worker committees tasked with

responding to any trends on an organization-wide basis. 299 At least
some of these surveys were agreed to in response to a need to identify
and preemptively remediate patterns of discrimination. 30o
Precedent for accommodations and knowledge of new forms of
accommodation could go hand in hand with educating policymakers.
Experts lament the need for additional research to refine our understanding of "accommodation needs, processes, and outcomes . . . as
well as the employer practices and policies that facilitate or pose barriers to accommodations." 30 1 Collecting data that can be crossreferenced with race, sex, job title, geography, and even multiple disabilities will also provide important information for policymakers,

298 Cf Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination,supra note 22, at 492-98
(describing Deloitte & Touche's companywide audit of desirable assignments broken down
by gender to remedy failures to retain and promote women employees as an example of
structural self-evaluation); Ana Avendano, #MeToo Inside the Labor Movement, NEw
LAB. FORUM (Jan. 2019), https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2019/01/24/metoo-inside-thelabor-movement (proposing, in the context of #MeToo, that "[w]ith a majority of unions'
consent, the AFL-CIO could require all unions to conduct climate assessment surveys
annually and make those reports public"); Katie Eyer, Claiming Disability, 101 B.U. L.
REV. 547, 550 (2021) (noting that in the millions of administered Project Implicit bias tests
between 2004 and 2016, implicit bias toward disability remained largely unchanged, while
during the same period attitudes toward sexual orientation and race improved by 33% and
13%, respectively (citing Tessa E.S. Charlesworth & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Patterns of
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: I. Long-Term Change and Stability from 2007 to 2016, 30
PSYCH. SCI. 174, 182-90 (2019)).
299 E.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Writers Guild of America, East, Inc.,
AFL-CIO, and Center for American Progress (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2021),
WRITERS GUILD AMERICA, EAST (2019), https://www.wgaeast.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/4/2019/01/TP-Contract-2019-2021-Executed.pdf; Collective Bargaining Agreement
Between The Union of Academic Student Employees & Postdocs at the University of

Washington and the University of Washington, UAW LOCAL 4121 (2020), https://
www.uaw4l2l.org/member-center-2/know-your-rights/contract.
300 See, e.g., 2020 Equity Survey, UAW LOCAL 4121, https://www.uaw4l2l.org/2020equity-survey (last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
301 Von Schrader et al., Accommodation Requests, supra note 156, at 341; see also
Balser, supra note 283, at 657 (highlighting that studying antecedents to and predictors of
accommodations are crucial for advancing theory, public policy, and practical outcomes for
individuals).
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advocates, and local governments to develop policies that understand
30 2
the intersection of social traits, work, and health.

Finally, collecting accommodations data could help shift public
norms. The presumptions of individuation and privacy around disability, while serving important interests, must also be tempered to alle-

viate the stigma that society continues to attach to identifying as
disabled. Scholars have recently drawn attention to how legal presumptions that disability adjudications should remain private may go
too far and undermine our ability to educate society and reshape attitudes. Notably, Elizabeth Emens has proposed revising EEOC rules
to permit employers to disclose the provision of accommodations to
the beneficiaries' coworkers if they provide consent, so that they may
emphasize how accommodations (such as expanded teleworking) also
benefit others. 30 3 Jasmine Harris has argued that the largely private
and closed contexts in which many other disability adjudications take
place reinscribe disability with social stigma because those processes
fail to enhance public understanding and thus generate better
norms. 304 As Harris observes, "overvaluing" privacy about disability
undermines our laws' ability to remediate discrimination when society
fails to detect these experiences and then redress the policies, prac30 5
Lacking awareness, the
tices, or structures that perpetuate them.
the "aesthetics"
emphasizing
stereotypes
general public falls back on

of who is disabled. 306 When we avoid any effort to publicize disability,
we operate under an impression that the number of people with disabilities is lower than other minority groups, when in fact the opposite
holds true. 30 7
Expanding the depth of information the government gathers confidentially, while providing free, centralized access to the results,
302 Although public health researchers understand social determinants of health to
include work and non-work conditions, efforts to prevent and respond to the COVID-19
pandemic mainly intervene in behavioral change rather than consistent social supports
such as paid sick and family leave and disability- and health-based accommodations. Wiley
& Bagenstos, supra note 268, at 1239.
303 Emens, Integrating Accommodation, supra note 59, at 897-908.
304 Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REv. 457, 459, 465, 498,
505-20, 524-26 (2015) (relying upon institutional design such as public access to

adjudication "to shape a broader disability consciousness" and arguing that proceedings
for guardianship, civil commitment, and special education should not be presumptively
closed); see also Harris, Taking Disability Public, supra note 11, at 1725-26 (discussing
disability laws' privacy norms as intended to preempt discrimination but noting they do so
at the expense of ameliorating stigma and misunderstanding of disabilities).
305 Harris, Taking Disability Public, supra note 11, at 1725-26.
306 Id. at 1726 (citing Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud
and Special Rights Discourse, 53 LAw & Soc. REv. 1051, 1070 (2019)).
307 Id. at 1726-27 (noting that people with disabilities are "the most populous minority
group" in the United States).
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would have considerable expressive benefits by normalizing accommodation as a universal endeavor. At present, federal data collection
efforts are hampered by the many purposive definitions of disability
across Census and independent surveys, such as questions intended to
detect eligibility for Social Security Disability Insurance and those
intended to identify people with disabilities who could work. 30 8
Even a modest information-gathering effort will further normalize our social commitment to dismantling structures that continue
to exclude vulnerable workers. A full view of society's experience with
requesting an accommodation would provide valuable industry- and
position-specific information about the United States' evolving norms
toward accommodations 30 9 and lay the groundwork for systematic
public and private planning around accommodations across organiza-

tions and industries.
The redistributive benefits of accommodations law currently
begin at the level closest to the workers and employers, but have
failed to generate norms to dismantle ableist environments and practices. If we expand our legal imagination, the state may scale responsibility for disability justice on a sectoral basis to support structural
analysis, norm change, and regulation going forward. Initially, such
monitoring may continue to be done through unions and labor organizations, but organizational precedent will also invite local governments to regulate minimum accommodations standards to vastly
reduce the need for individuated bargaining.
B.

Harmonizing Workplace Law

Labor activism has traditionally provided a source of employee
empowerment and voice in the workplace and could be considered an
308 Burkhauser, Houtenville & Tennant, supra note 2, at 195-96. It comes as little
surprise, then, that members of the general public do not have an accurate understanding
of whether they are disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

309

In the United Kingdom, a "right to request" flexibility, which may be made once a

year as to work hours, time, or location, was enacted in 2002 under the Flexible Working
Act and gradually expanded from a limited set of caregivers over time to all employees in
2014. Robert C. Bird & Liz Brown, The United Kingdom Right to Request as a Model for
Flexible Work in the European Union, 55 AM. Bus. L.J. 53, 67-68 (2018) (citing
Employment Act 2002, c. 22, § 47(1)-(2) (UK)). However, the right to request has
procedural and substantive corollaries to the ADA interactive process and undue hardship
defense, and remedies are limited to procedural grounds. Anna Danziger & Shelley Waters
Boots, Urb. Inst., Memo on the Impact of the United Kingdom's Flexible Working Act 3-4
(2008), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=
legal. Because the right-to-request process is not a mandate, unions and parents' groups
maintain that many who would benefit from flexible arrangements do not ask for them out
of fear of being refused or jeopardizing their careers. Id. However, within the first three

years, availabilities of job-sharing increased 39% to 59%, and availability of flextime
increased from 38% to 55%. Id. at 2.
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intrinsic source of leverage for employees during the interactive process. However, the doctrine and practice of labor and employment law

have produced the view within labor law-and thus labor
organizing-that disability accommodations involve only individual
rights that threaten collective representation. 310 The choice to meld
the ADA's employment provisions with Title VII's model and
enforcement infrastructure destined it to develop isolated from labor
law and to rely on potentially lengthy litigation for enforcement. The

dearth of union organizing or other collective advocacy around
accommodations 311 and the precipitous decline in unionization 312
have further hamstrung the potential of the accommodations mandate
reaching those workers with the least leverage at work. Legal and
management theory scholars agree, however, that an integrated
framework for employment and labor law is desirable. 313 To harmonize workplace law, existing law must shift in three respects.
First, the NLRA must be amended to unequivocally state that
Section 7 protected concerted activity includes inquiries about accommodations or other antidiscrimination rights, whether for oneself or

other employees. Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA are robust: they
broadly safeguard worker activism as "protected concerted activity,"
and prohibit retaliation against such activity regardless of whether the
employee is a union member. 314 Therefore, unions, other labor
310 See supra note 41; Hickox, supra note 12, at 150 ("When the ADA was adopted,

some saw it as one more extension of individual rights 'signaling and causing the demise of
the industrial pluralist model of collective bargaining."' (quoting Richard Bales, Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Conflicts Between Reasonable Accommodation and
Collective Bargaining, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 164 (1992))).

311 In the most recent data available, only 49 of 400 sample CBAs included a provision
promising compliance with the ADA, although ninety-four percent of CBAs contain a
"general" non-discrimination clause. Hickox, supra note 12, at 157 (citing N. PETER
LAREAU,

DRAFTING

THE UNION

CONTRAcr:

A HANDBOOK

FOR THE MANAGEMENT

§

5A-10 (2008)).
312 See supra note 203.
313 E.g., HOGLER, supra note 17, at 252 (urging the "integration" of labor and
employment laws that have been interpreted to conflict on account of varying policy
concerns originating from each); Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, "So Closely
Intertwined": Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135, 1138, 1171 (2013)
NEGOTIATOR

(arguing issues of labor organizing and race coincide and provide grounds for coalition).
There have not been many such proposals, but leading ones include Naomi Schoenbaum,
Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605 (2017); Benjamin I. Sachs,
Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 2685 (2008); and Richard A. Bales,
The DiscordBetween Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical
Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 750-60 (1997).

314 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-198, §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 49 Stat. 449,
449, 452 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)) (defining worker activism as
protected concerted activity and prohibiting retaliation on that basis, regardless of whether
the workers are members of a union or other formal labor organization).
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organizers, and employees should be able to rely on these protections,
which play a more robust role than currently conceived in expanding
workers' ability to support each other in seeking accommodations.
Nonetheless, oscillations in the composition of the NLRB have gener-

ated split opinions that cast doubt on whether discussing discrimination-under the ADA or other employment statutes-with others is

either "selfish" or instead "concerted activity" under Section 7.315
Second, neither courts nor policymakers have sought to develop
labor and employment laws or their administrative functions such that
their protections complement or reinforce each other. Scholarship on
labor bargaining and antidiscrimination activism has maintained that
employers and unions can agree to terms that achieve diversity-based
goals that benefit all employees, challenging the circumspect views

toward diversity among some labor organizers and providing potential
grounds for solidarity.3 16 Thus, the NLRA should be further amended
to clarify that: (1) accommodations may be a mandatory subject of
bargaining as between employers and labor organizations in reaching
a CBA; but also (2) that a CBA must always be construed to permit
deviation from terms in order for employers and unions to comply
with the ADA in the event that a provision conflicts with civil rights
obligations. 317
In entering an agreement, employers and unions are already obligated to bargain over accommodations that "'materially, substantially
315 Compare Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 151 (2014)
(responding to NLRB Member dissent portraying an employee who experienced sexual
harassment as "raising a personal complaint not shared by others" and "annoying" them,

by reasoning that even if the discrimination is substantiated, "[i]t is also well established
that an employee may act partly from selfish motivations and still be engaged in concerted
activity, even if she is the only immediate beneficiary of the solicitation"), with Holling

Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 301, 303-04 (2004) ("[W]here one employee is the alleged victim
[of sexual harassment], that lone employee's protest is not concerted. And, even if the
victim seeks support from another employee, and that seeking of support is concerted
activity, the 'mutual aid or protection' element may be missing.").
316 Michael Z. Green, Union Commitment to Racial Diversity (advocating for "creative
contract terms that . . . includ[e] dispute resolution tools within the grievance process that

will promote worker solidarity on matters of both race and class"), in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 381, 381, 388-91
(Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden eds., 2020); cf Garden & Leong, supra note 313, at
1138, 1171 (arguing issues of labor organizing and race coincide and provide grounds for
coalition).
317 See supra note 311; infra notes 322-25; see also Deborah A. Widiss, Divergent
Interests: Union Representation of Individual Employment Discrimination Claims, 87

IND.

L.J. 421, 425-26, 429-30 (2012) (discussing the reasons why labor unions may deprioritize
members' ability to litigate discrimination claims in anticipation of divergent interests if
discrimination claims raised by a minority of members may pit members against each
other).
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or significantly' affect[] terms and conditions of employment," 3 1 8 and
more fundamentally, "over the elimination of discrimination in the
workplace" in a meaningful way. 319 Not all accommodations change
terms and conditions of employment, such as when a coworker agrees
to assume a job function of another for a limited period. But if the law
expressly treated antidiscrimination goals as a collective good that
affects conditions for additional workers, ADA accommodations
could be "material." For example, refusing a worker regular breaks
for medical appointments or the provision of a ramp incline on policy
grounds would rise to the level of materiality.
Moreover, involving unions and labor organizations when an
accommodation could be denied creates a potentially multiplying phenomenon with collective impact. 320 Stacy Hickox has observed that
union involvement not only increases employees' perceptions of procedural justice, but as a "repeat participant" in accommodations negotiations, unions gain and apply knowledge about ADA rights
workplace-wide and facilitate coworkers' acceptance of accommodations that may require setting aside seniority or other CBA
provisions. 321
Finally, the ADA must be amended to correct the Supreme
Court's improvident interpretation in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
which discourages employers from providing any accommodation that
318 Hickox, supra note 12, at 156 (quoting William J. McDevitt, Seniority Systems and
the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Fate of "Reasonable Accommodation" After

Eckles, 9 ST.

THOMAS

L. REV. 359, 374-75 (1997)).

319 Id. at 157 (discussing employers' and labor organizations' mutual duty to bargain
over mandatory terms under the statute and Board authority (citing Farmers' Coop.

Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290, 295 (1968))). Employers violate their duty to bargain through
conduct that prevents the union from also "fulfilling its duty of fair representation and
expose[s] the union to legal liabilities under nondiscrimination statutes." Id. (quoting

Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 235 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1084 (1978)). Mandatory subjects of
bargaining are outlined in Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) of the NLRA and codified at
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d), and the Supreme Court deemed subjects of bargaining to
be either mandatory or permissive in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,

356 U.S. 342 (1958).
320 See Carrie Griffin Basas, A Collective Good: Disability Diversity as a Value in Public
Sector Collective BargainingAgreements, 87 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 793, 831-32, 836-38 (2013)
(noting that CBAs in which disability rights are recognized as civil rights could positively
impact broader workplace dynamics).
321 Hickox, supra note 12, at 190-91; see also Basas, supra note 320, at 823 (providing an
example of a state employee CBA entitling employees seeking an accommodation to union
representation upon their request); cf Michael Z. Green, Reconsidering Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution for Black Work Matters, 70 SMU L. REv. 639, 651 (2017)
(proposing a union "as a social or business network or an identity caucus within a union

might be able to help negotiate" on behalf of Black employees to address information
imbalances within workplaces).
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deviates from contracts or company policies. 322 In Barnett, the Court
crafted a judicial exemption disapproving of any disability accommodation that would contravene a seniority policy as unreasonable
absent "special circumstances," an approach that unfortunately persists.323 Title VII contains a provision protecting seniority systems that
provide some employees with preferable terms or benefits without
incurring liability for discrimination, 324 while Congress expressly
rejected the inclusion of such an exemption in the ADA. 325
When we conceive of the ADA's interactive process as de facto
bargaining, it becomes clear that a market-mediated framework has
conditioned lawmakers, courts, and labor activists to limit the mandate to triangulated bargaining over accommodation as among the
employee, employer, and coworkers-or any CBA. 326 The law of
accommodations casts all requests in terms of zero-sum interests
among these private stakeholders. 327
Barnett's holding is even more stringent than the compromise the
EEOC originally struck in its interpretive guidance. Originally, the
agency considered any potentially conflicting CBA provision "relevant" to determining whether an employer could raise undue hardship
322 535 U.S. 391, 404-06 (2002) (holding a disabilities accommodation request is not
reasonable if it overrides a seniority provision contained in an existing policy, unless
special circumstances such as formal or informal exceptions altered employees'
expectations regarding that policy).
323 Id.; Hickox, supra note 12, at 162-63, 164 n.99, 165 n.101 (citing cases and noting
courts have extended Barnett beyond general seniority policies to other companywide
policies and CBAs). Although this judicial move favored symmetry toward a neoclassical
economic view of antidiscrimination law, I argue that the symmetry should be applied
toward public norms modifying private ones to eliminate the Title VII seniority exception.
See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in AntidiscriminationLaw, 2017
Wis. L. REV. 69 (arguing for symmetrical rights design for traits across statutes such as
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA).
324 As a matter of statutory asymmetry, Title VII's provision expressly protects the
operation of a "bona fide seniority .. . system," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), a provision that the
ADA lacks. However, the deference to employer preferences and greater familiarity with
Title VII may have led to Barnett's imprudent result.
325 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 420-21 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Because Congress modeled
several of the ADA's provisions on Title VII, its failure to replicate Title VII's exemption
for seniority systems leaves the statute ambiguous, albeit with more than a hint that
seniority rules do not inevitably carry the day.").
326 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 32 (1989) (providing the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources's opinion that a seniority provision in a CBA could be a factor in
determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAw 101-336, THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES Acr 130 (1991);
infra note 328 (citing EEOC regulations anticipating conflict with CBAs as a potential

basis for undue hardship).
327 See, e.g., Emens, supra note 2, at 2365 fig.1 (discussing courts' "traditional"
evaluation of accommodation requests in terms of costs to the employer and benefits to the
employee, and some consideration given to costs (alone) to third parties).
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and required the employer and union to negotiate a variance in good
faith to facilitate accommodation. 32 8 Congress must clarify that workplace contracts and policies cannot supervene civil rights obligations,
and override Barnett and its substantive restriction of potentially reasonable accommodations as incorrect.
Despite ascendant social mobilization around workplace safety

and structural injustice, lead labor law reform proposals to protect
workers still do not address accommodations law. 329 Because the vast

majority of Americans are left to bargain alone for their safety and
livelihood, reform proposals must be grounded in a theory of accommodations that extends beyond employment law's individuated
approaches. These amendments would clarify labor organizations'
legal responsibilities to address antidiscrimination work as concerted

activity, so that such concerns are not subordinated or avoided in
workplace organizing and advocacy, but amplified through public dis-

course. Approaching accommodations as a collective social good protected by labor law, rather than a one-off contractual deal violative of
collective contracts, will in turn clarify labor protections for accommo-

dation requests unrelated to a protected status should the mandate
later expand to all workers.330
C.

Ending Cost-Shifting for Smaller Businesses

The state can also use its most distributive too1331-the

tax

code-to reimburse smaller employers for any disability accommoda328 Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,726, 35,727 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (amending interpretive
guidance in response to public comments regarding conflicts with any CBA provision); 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 435 (2020) (noting that the defense of undue hardship is
unavailable simply by the employer "showing that the provision of the accommodation has

a negative impact on the morale of its other employees but not on the ability of these
employees to perform their jobs"); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
EEOC NOTICE No. 915.002, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES

AcT (1999), 1999 WL 35770204 (rejecting a per se rule that an employer can claim an

accommodation imposes an undue hardship merely because it violates a CBA), cited in
Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000), revoked as superseded by

Barnett, 535 U.S. 391.
329

See,

e.g., SHARON BLOCK

&

BENJAMIN SACHS, HARV.

L.

SCH., CLEAN SLATE FOR

WORKER POWER: BUILDING A JUST ECONOMY AND DEMOCRACY

27-28, 62-63, 94 (2020)

(proposing improvements to the NLRA, the Social Security Act, Federal Arbitration Act,
and Internal Revenue Code, and addressing disability solely with respect to including
disabled workers who earn subminimum wage as employees).
330 See supra note 309 and accompanying discussion.
331 I intentionally employ "distribution" instead of redistribution, in a departure from its
more common use in discussion of the ADA. The canonical view of disability frames

redistribution as a manner of special treatment in the form of a mandate on employers that
sets the ADA apart from "traditional" civil rights law, as discussed supra in Section I.B.1.
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tions they provide that do incur an expense. Most accommodations do
not incur an out-of-pocket expense at all, 3 3 2 and other countries have

implemented more typical social insurance versions of an accommodation subsidy.3 33
Such a proposal would expand partial tax subsidies for such
accommodations currently available to small businesses to full subsi-

dies for nearly all accommodations. As discussed below, expanding
our social insurance framework to accommodations would transform

access for employees across industries.
Companies, in particular small- and medium-sized businesses,
indicate that employer tax credits and incentives would improve hiring
of workers with disabilities. 3 34 Although there are no reliable estimates for full public funding of accommodations, such a proposal
See also Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations
as Antidiscrimination,153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 593 & n.54 (2004) [hereinafter Stein, Same
Struggle, Different Difference] (citing academic sources that suggest accommodations for
disabled people constitute special treatment for them). However, distribution through the
tax base to advance accommodations comports with the corrective justice approach that
Bagenstos and Jolls, among others, advanced. See supra Section I.B.1. A corrective justice
view rejects the flawed assumption in the canonical approach: that accommodation costs

are "internally engendered by the disabled person's inherent lower capability, rather than
externally caused by social conditions." Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, supra,

at 597.
332 One study estimates that fifty-six percent of disability accommodations do not cost
the employer anything, and the median cost for other accommodations was $500. JOB

COsT, HIGH IMPACT
3 (2020), https://askjan.org/publications/Topic-Downloads.cfm?pubid=962628&action=
download&pubtype=pdf.
333 Through its Access to Work program, the UK provides government subsidies to
employees to subsidize accommodations such as "aid and equipment in the workplace,"
ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS: Low

adaptations to existing equipment, and extra travel costs. U.K. Dep't for Work & Pensions,
Guidance Access to Work Factsheet for Employers, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/access-to-work-guide-for-employers/access-to-work-factsheet-for-

employers (Apr. 1, 2021). In Japan, companies must abide by a quota for employing people
with disabilities, for which non-compliance requires them to pay a levy that will fund
government subsidies and aid to companies trying to meet the quota. KATHARINA HEYER,
RIGHTs ENABLED: THE DISABILITY REVOLUTION, FROM THE US, TO GERMANY AND
JAPAN, TO THE UNITED NATIONS 131-33 (2015). Israel can subsidize the cost employers
incur in providing an accommodation up to 60,000 NIS, or approximately $18,431. State
Funding for Workplace Accommodations for Employees with Disabilities, KOL-ZCHUT
https://www.kolzchut.org.il/en/StateFunding_forWorkplaceAccommodationsfor_
EmployeesWithDisabilities (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
334 See U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PERPSPECTIVES, supra note 155, at
17 (reporting percentages of companies citing employer tax credits and incentives as

strategies that would be helpful in hiring people with disabilities at 66.8% for small
businesses, 70.5% for medium-sized businesses, and 77.1% for large businesses). An
experimental vignette study testing employers' willingness to accommodate job candidates
who revealed a need for accommodations also concluded that they are chiefly concerned
with the costs of accommodations. Shinall, supra note 12, at 673; cf id. at 675 & n.166
(proposing accommodation cost caps at $500 to account for employer concerns about cost).
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would be scored in Congress before passage 335 and may support
scholars' more recent predictions that economic integration of people
with disabilities provides a net gain for the economy. 33 6
As observed earlier, the ADA places responsibility on society to
facilitate the full participation of people with disabilities. 33 7 Its corrective justice frame could have allocated responsibility for any costs
incurred by the mandate on the general public, rather than employers
alone, to achieve its ends. At the turn of the twentieth century, a shift
in U.S. tax policy ushered in our modern fiscal polity, one guided "not
simply by the functional and structural need for government revenue
but by concerns for equity and economic and social justice." 338 The
government implemented public subsidies through its national tax
base irrespective of self-interest, i.e., regardless of beneficiaries' economic class or region, because sustainable growth of the modern state
required taxation. 3 39 Over the last twenty-five years in particular, the
United States has increasingly relied on tax law to achieve
non-revenue-raising goals for social programs such as the Affordable
Care Act's health care mandate. 3 40
The federal government could finance the expansion of existing
but woefully underutilized subsidies, 34 1 the Disabled Access Credit
and Barrier Removal Deduction, which substantially reimburse
employers if they incur an expense in implementing an accommodation.3 42 They provide to small businesses a 50% tax credit for an
335 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside-An Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part

II, 66 STAN. L. REv. 725, 763 (2014) (discussing the importance of the Congressional
Budget Office's scoring of proposed legislation).
336 See infra notes 354-55 and accompanying text.
337 See supra Section I.B.
338 Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era
Economists and the Intellectual Foundationsof the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1793, 1793, 1795, 1798 (2005) (observing that a transition to a direct tax on income and
other wealth "shifted the burden of financing a modern, industrial state to those segments
of society," i.e., the wealthy North and Northeast, to meet the mounting demands placed
upon the public sector and government spending).
339 See id. at 1798.
340 Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation
of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 67-69 (2013).

341 As of 1999, the only year for which data is available, only 0.14% (1 out of 686)
corporations and 0.06% (1 out of 1,570) individuals with a business affiliation reported the
Disabled Access Credit on their tax returns. U.S. GEN. Acr. OFF., GAO-03-39, BUSINESS
TAX

INCENTIVES:

INCENTIVES

TO

EMPLOY

WORKERS

wITH

DISABILITIES

RECEIVE

14 (2002).
342 I.R.C. §§ 44, 190 (providing annual maximum credit to small businesses of fifty

LIMITED USE AND HAVE AN UNCERTAIN IMPACT

percent of "eligible access expenditures" that exceed $250 but do not exceed $10,250, and

annual maximum deduction of $15,000 to businesses for "qualified architectural and
transportation barrier removal expenses," respectively).
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accommodation expense, and a tax deduction of up to $15,000 for
removing architectural or transportation barriers. 343 Under the expansion proposed here, payroll taxes would fund small and medium
employers to receive a 100% tax credit of up to $5,000 per employee
per location. 344 While it appears to function as a cap, 345 more than half
of employers report that accommodations incurred no cost and for
employers that experienced a one-time cost, the median expenditure

is $500.346 Expanding employer reimbursements to resemble a social
insurance model will reassure employers and, as some scholars have
noted, reduce stigma tied to entitlement programs. 34 7 The tax programs must be publicized, however, as the Disabled Access Credit is
hardly used by corporate employers. 348
I foresee three major consequences of expanding tax subsidies for
disability accommodations in this manner. First, filings from such a
credit would further permit the government to receive information
about the types of accommodation granted, the levels of cost, and further the state's research expertise by firm type and industry. This
information could be used to inform legislative and executive policy,
from developing default expectations for modifications based upon

343 Id.
344 The amount is half the $10,000 value of the ceiling for the current Disabled Access
Credit's subsidy for accommodations not related to architecture or transportation, i.e., fifty
percent of a $10,000 employer expenditure by small businesses. Small businesses are
currently defined as those with gross annual receipts of under $1 million or fewer than 30
full-time employees. I.R.C. § 44. Medium-sized businesses could be defined as those that
are not small businesses and employ fewer than 250 full-time employees. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF LAB., SURVEY OF EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES, supra note 155, at 2 (defining
medium-sized companies as those that employ 15 to 249 employees). In combination,
small- and medium-sized businesses employ approximately half of U.S. private sector
workers. U.S. SMALL BUSINEss ADMINIsTRATION OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2020), https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/

05122043/Small-Business-FAQ-2020.pdf.
345 Shinall recently proposed a bright-line cap of potentially a few hundred dollars,
supplemented by expanded disability entitlement programs funded by a payroll tax.
Shinall, supra note 12, at 673-81; see also id. at 676-77 (summarizing prior legislative
interest in capping employer expense on an ADA accommodation). The proposal
advanced here is more akin to a 100% subsidy given that Congress previously approved of
a reimbursement of up to $5,000 to small-business employers under the current 50%

subsidy.
346 Benefits and Costs of Accommodation, supra note 271. When asked how much they
paid for an accommodation beyond what they would have paid for an employee without a
disability who was in the same position, the median answer given by employers was $20. Id.
347 See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Disability Rights, Welfare Law, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 2483,
2515 (2011) (proposing a disabled worker tax credit program, that arguably would lack the
stigma of public welfare as it would be administered through the tax system).
348

See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
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specific disabilities (with public input),349 to directly subsidizing
research to advance universal design technologies that innovate in
350
response to the most prevalent workplace barriers.
Second, and perhaps the most important consequence of the fully
distributive model, the undue hardship analysis prominently features
351
cost in determining whether an employer should grant the request.
The implementing regulation further defines "difficulty or expense" to

consider the accommodation's cost, "taking into consideration the
35 2
Thus, even after impleavailability of tax credits and deductions."
menting the subsidy proposed here, not every accommodation will be
deemed reasonable or vitiate the undue hardship defense. An
employer may still justify why an accommodation could not be
granted under the other statutory factors, but less well-resourced busi-

nesses will no longer be exempted from remediating ableism based
upon cost alone. Expanding current tax credits and deductions for disability accommodations to full subsidies under the framework of
social insurance would serve as a rebuttal to employers or coworkers
that respond negatively to workers seeking accommodations with
35 3
Meanwhile, large employers remain
zero-sum resource arguments.
in the best position to capture the long-term benefits of accommodations, and would not be subsidized.
Third, this proposal could benefit parties beyond employees, such
as the state, employers, and the public, long-term. At passage, the
ADA appealed to a broad political cross-section of lawmakers, as disability advocates and political conservatives agreed that the cost of
removing barriers to employment would be offset by a reduction in
354
For many employers, any
reliance upon public safety net benefits.
349 See, e.g., supra note 63 and accompanying text (arguing for default expectations for
modifications in the form of updated baseline standards for accessible information

technology).

350 Currently, the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Disability Employment Policy
authors articles and videos, and convenes roundtables regarding the benefits of universal
design, but private industry and non-governmental entities drive innovation. See Off. of
Disability Emp. Pol'y, Universal Design Resources, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., https://
www.dol.gov/agencies/odep/program-areas/employment-supports/universal-design/
resources (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
351 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(b)(i) (listing factors to be considered in whether an employer
can establish undue hardship, including "the nature and cost of the accommodation needed
under this chapter").
352 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i) (2020).
353 See supra notes 59-60, 341 and accompanying text.
354 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 10,877 (1990) (statement of Rep. George Miller) ("If
[people with disabilities] are locked out of jobs, then society must bear the cost of
maintaining these individuals and their families-families that otherwise would be selfsupporting and paying taxes."). See generally Bagenstos, supra note 146, at 958-75

(discussing the development of the ADA as welfare reform).
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costs of providing an accommodation are recouped through worker

retention, productivity, and overall morale. 355 The benefits of a broad
subsidy for accommodations are also expressive: no differently than
Social Security or workers' compensation, disabilities are contingencies that society prepares for and is collectively responsible for

remediating.35 6
While some politicians might balk at the concept of expanding

benefit programs, models for a social insurance approach to tax policy
have already been popularly accepted and successful in the form of
Social Security Disability at the federal level, and in paid family leave
laws currently funded through modest payroll taxes in nine states and
Washington, D.C. 357 Both programs finally made it possible for
employees of small businesses to receive crucial benefits anyone may
need at any time. Lawmakers' response to the COVID-19 pandemic
under the rubric of social insurance may provide a model for further
workplace accommodations. For example, in 2020, Congress enacted a
publicly funded subsidy requiring employers to provide paid family
and medical leave during the pandemic, an accommodation 100%
reimbursable to employers through the tax code. 358
As scholars express increasing concern over the limits of antidiscrimination law as a whole, 359 one may draw the conclusion that there
is nothing more we may expect from law or the state. 360 This Article's
355 Helen P. Hartnett, Heather Stuart, Hanna Thurman, Beth Loy & Linda Carter
Batiste, Employers' Perceptions of the Benefits of Workplace Accommodations: Reasons to
Hire, Retain and Promote People with Disabilities, 34 J. VOCATIONAL REHAB. 17 (2011).
356 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in
Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION
FOR LAW AND POLITICS 13, 17 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013)
(defining vulnerability theory to encompass vulnerability as a "universal and constant
aspect of the human condition" that is "not deviant, but natural and inevitable").
357 These states are California, New Jersey, Rhode Island, New York, Washington,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Oregon, and Colorado. NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMS.,
STATE

PAID

FAMILY

AND

MEDICAL

LEAVE

INSURANCE

LAWS

(2021), https://

www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/paid-leave/state-paidfamily-leave-laws.pdf.
358 The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) was the first federal
program to mandate paid family and medical leave, but only on an emergency basis until

December 31, 2020. FFCRA, Pub. L. No. 116-127,

§ 5102(a), 134 Stat. 178, 195-96, 198

(2020) (paid sick time requirement); id. § 7001, 134 Stat. at 210-12 (payroll credit for
required paid sick leave); id. § 7003, 134 Stat. at 214-17 (payroll credit for required paid
family leave) (sunset 2020). Employers were permitted to voluntarily extend the benefit
through March 31, 2021. COVID-related Tax Relief Act of 2020, Pub. L. 116-260, secs.

7001(c), 7003(c),

§ 286(b)(1), (b)(3), 134 Stat. 1964, 1989-91.

359 See e.g., Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 25, at 46-47 (expressing
reservations regarding the efficacy of a structural approach to remediating employment
discrimination).
360 Doron Dorfman and Mariela Yabo's examination of disability accommodations law
and regulation in Israel highlights preventive mechanisms such as affirmative duties of
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proposals are inspired by the social movements and political advocacy
leading up to the ADA's passage and in the recent years, which now

challenge the frames embedded in accommodations law that have sub3 61
As has been noted before, the first calls
stantively limited its utility.
in legal scholarship for a federal civil rights model integrating workers

with disabilities did not see passage of the ADA until twenty-four
years later. 362 The law's unique ability to condition many to believe it
is the only legitimate approach has not been an impediment to its
evolution. 363 All the more concerning is the silence when a law fails to
work as intended, and we have no framework with which to diagnose
setbacks in our efforts to eliminate inequalities.
CONCLUSION

The ADA's goal of explicit institutional transformation has

inspired advocates to adopt the accommodations mandate as a template to new contexts where workplace restructuring is sorely needed.
This momentum to replicate the mandate may be a starting point to
further chip away at barriers that exclude workers and reify social inequalities. Nonetheless, the current framework of de facto bargaining,
premised primarily upon zero-sum assumptions, places a heavy
burden on employees and employers to advance the profound change
envisioned. They will continue to face significant headwinds in doing
so if legal reforms neglect three decades of experience with shortcomings in the institutional and procedural design of the mandate.
By proposing new approaches to developing structural analysis,
advancing antidiscriminatory norms through information gathering,
enhancing collective problem-solving approaches, and applying a
social insurance approach to eliminate resistance to cost shifting, this

&

"large organizations"-including local governments-to report progress on implementing
building access codes to the responsible national commission. Dorfman & Yabo, supra
note 20, at 1248-49.
361 See supra notes 21, 41, 298-300 and accompanying text. For example, Sameer Ashar
and Catherine Fisk provide an important analysis of governance experimentalism among
workers' centers upheld as models for the "new labor law," further arguing that social
movement organizations will channel worker activism "in coalition with, or in lieu of
unions." Sameer M. Ashar & Catherine L. Fisk, Democratic Norms and Governance
Experimentalism in Worker Centers, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2019, at 141, 141.
They, too, predict that laws and institutions pertaining to workplace collective action will
"transform over the next five to ten years into something substantially different from the
institutions and law of the past century." Id. at 142.
362 Stein et al., supra note 1, at 745 (citing Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the
World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALiF. L. REv. 841 (1966)).
363 See Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 LAw
CONTEMP.

PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 71, 83-90 (arguing that neoliberalism is hegemonic); see

also Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, supra note 331, at 603 (discussing the
difficulty of altering a socially accepted definition of the normative universe).
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Article introduces potentially iterative, long-term projects in public
and private planning toward accommodations and innovative workplace restructuring. It seeks to reopen conversation about the capacity
of law to reshape society, and predicts that activism will introduce
alternatives to push legislators and courts to embrace them in the
future. Perhaps then, we can reimagine how the transformation of millions more environments may finally be within reach.
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